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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to ascertain factors that may 
explain an Australian firm's approach to accounting for 
goodwill and to examine the diversity that existed in 
accounting for goodwill in the pre-standard era. Utilising 
a costly contracting framework, determinants of the 
accounting policy choice are proposed and three separate 
groups of hypotheses are formulated. 
The ex ante hypothesis in this study utilises industry as 
an explanatory variable that would be expected to explain 
the motivations of accounting choices by firms. It was 
found that there is no significant association between 
industry classification and the choice of method in 
accounting for goodwill by firms. The result does not 
necessarily refute the hypothesis as this analysis only 
dealt with a small number of industries, each of which did 
not contain a large number of firms. It is believed that a 
larger sample size with suffic1ent numbers in each of the 
industry groups would 
conducted. 
enable a more valid test to be 
The second group of hypotheses relate ex post incentives to 
the choice of method in accounting for goodwill. In 
relation to the debt hypothesis, the association of firms' 
interest 
method 
coverage ratios and the choice of 
is not significant which conforms to 
accounting 
what was 
expected. Contrary to expectation, the debt hypothesis is 
iii 
unable to be supported when using debentures as an 
explanatory variable. Empirical support was found for the 
proposition that firms which choose income-increasing 
methods of accounting for goodwill are more likely to be of 
a smaller size than those who 
accounting methods. 
choose income-decreasing 
The final group of hypotheses seeks to ascertain whether 
there is a difference in the size and the interest coverage 
ratios of firms that use single and firms that use dual 
policies of accounting for goodwill. In relation to firms' 
interest coverage ratios, it was found that there is no 
significant difference amongst firms that either use single 
income-increasing or single income-decreasing policies of 
accounting for goodwill and firms that use dual policies. 
In respect of the variable size, it was found that there is 
a significant difference in the size of firms that use 
single income-decreasing and firms that use dual policies 
of accounting for goodwill. Firms that use single income-
decreasing policies of accounting for goodwill are larger 
in size than those who use dual policies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
There has been a significant amount of debate generated 1n 
the financial community over an extended period of time tn 
relation to accounting for goodwill. An extensive amount 
of research has been conducted of the methods adopted by 
Australian firms in accounting for goodwill, but, some of 
the previous studies have tended to adopt a superficial 
approach. It can be ascertained that they have not 
provided adequate explanations in relation to the factors 
which may influence a firm in its approach to accounting 
for goodwill, but have focused on the various accounting 
methods adopted and the frequency of such methods. 
This study was motivated by the des1re to ascertain factors 
that may explain an Australian firm's approach to 
accounting for goodwill and to examine the diversity that 
existed in accounting for goodwill in the pre-standard era. 
The pre-standard era was selected for study as there were 
no "rules" governing the treatment of goodwill or any other 
factors present, for example a pending Exposure Draft, that 
would have a significant influence on the way in which 
firms accounted for goodwill in their annual accounts. 
The study employs contracting theory and political costs 
theory to formulate hypotheses for managers choice of 
2 
1n relation to goodwill. Positive accounting methods 
accounting theory supplies a useful predictive model of 
the accounting procedures that underlie the financial 
statements (Watts and Zimmerman [ 1986]). Utilising this 
framework, three separate groups of hypotheses are 
developed. 
The choice of accounting technique 1n the context of costly 
contracting can be characterised as either ex ante or ex 
post (Whittred and Zimmer [1990]). Ex ante refers to the 
choice of technique being made at the time when a contract 
1s negotiated whilst ex post refers to the choice being 
made after the contracts are put into place. The ex ante 
hypothesis 1n this study utilises industry as an 
explanatory variable that would be expected to explain the 
motivations of accounting choices by firms. 
The second group of hypotheses relate to the commonly 
tested ex post hypotheses being the debt hypothesis and the 
size hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman [ 1986]). Variations 
of these hypotheses are formulated and relate ex post 
incentives to the method of accounting for goodwill as 
shown in the annual accounts. The evidence supplied by the 
accounting choices literature suggests that political costs 
motivate the choice of income-decreasing accounting methods 
whilst contracting costs motivate the choice of income­
increasing accounting methods (Watts and Zimmerman [1986]). 
3 
The final group of hypotheses seeks to ascertain whether 
there 1s a difference 1n the size and interest coverage 
ratios of firms that use single and firms that use dual 
policies of accounting for goodwill. As it appears that 
there 1s no published research 10 relation to this area, 
there 1s no explicit guide as to how 
firms may differ. 
attributes of these 
The following chapters of the thesis are organised as 
follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the previous 
research 10 relation to accounting for goodwill whilst 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of positive accounting 
theory. Hypotheses are formulated 10 Chapter 4 and Chapter 
5 details the research method. Chapter 6 provides a sample 
profile, results of the statistical tests conducted and a 
discussion of their implications. Finally, Chapter 7 
concludes by providing a summary of the study, comments on 
its limitations and suggests areas for further research. 
CHAPTER 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PREVIOUS RESEARCH IN 
RELATION TO ACCOUNTING FOR GOODWILL 
2.1 Previous Research in Relation to 
Accounting for Goodwil l 
4 
Miller (1973) noted that Australian accounting practices 1n 
relation to the treatment of goodwill were perhaps more 
diverse than any other accounting treatments. There were 
major variations occurring 1n the methods used 1n 
accounting for goodwill. The guidance which had been 
provided by the professional accounting bodies had been 
ignored to a large extent. Miller points out that this is 
not surprising as the Institute of Chartered Accountants' 
statements only contained isolated subordinate references 
to goodwill and the committee reports published by the 
Australian Society of Accountants were denied official 
backing. 
capability 
Confidence 
of the 
1n published accounts and the 
accounting profession to resolve 
reporting problems suffered due to the widely discrepant 
practices being utilised. 
Gibson and Francis (1975) conducted the first formal 
Australian study of accounting practices adopted 1n respect 
of goodwill on consolidation. At the time the study was 
conducted there existed a great degree of flexibility 
5 
because the professional accounting bodies, the Companies 
Act, and local stock exchange listing requirements did not 
specify any guideline s 1n accounting for goodwill. Gibson 
and Francis pointed out that the treatment by Australian 
public companies of goodwill on consolidation provided 
excellent opportunity to study the deve lopment 
" an 
of 
accounting 1n an almost completely free situation because 
of the many alternatives advocated 1n the literature ". 
(Gibson and Francis [ 1975, p. 167]). 
The survey s intention was to provide observations of 
current accounting practices pertaining to, or affecting 
goodwill on consolidation. 
' 
As a result of this the report 
did not attempt to assess the soundness of practices 1n use 
but simply focused on finding out what was done. A total 
of 525 Australian public companies listed on the Melbourne 
Stock Exchange as at 6 November 1974 were included in the 
survey. The response rate to the questionnaire was 53% 
which consisted of a total of 277 companies of which 196 
indicated that consolidated financial statements were 
prepared. 
Gibson and Francis (1975) discovered that 88 of the 196 
companies preparing consolidated financial statements made 
some type of subsequent adjustme nt. In regards to the 
different accounting practices implemented, the most 
frequent was the lump sum write-off, although there was 
support for the systematic and directors' discretion type 
practices. The dire ctors' discretion practice employs an 
I ' 
I: 
i' 
\1 
6 
ad hoc approach unlike the systematic practice which 1s a 
regular amortisation policy. They found out that there was 
no consistency in the proprietorship item affected, as 38 
companies wrote off goodwill against consolidated profits 
and 50 made the adjustment directly against consolidated 
reserves. 
The study conducted by Gibson and Francis identified four 
main methods utilised by companies 10 accounting for 
positive goodwill. 
These four methods were defined as follows: 
- Immediate write-off. The company makes a lump sum write-
off of goodwill immediately to either consolidated profits 
or consolidated reserves. 
Systematic amortisation. This 1s the method whereby 
goodwill 1s capitalised and 1s amortised by systematic 
charges against either consolidated profits or consolidated 
reserves. 
Unsystematic amortisation. Alternatively termed as 
"write-off at directors' discretion". This method involves 
the capitalisation of goodwill and consists of the 
directors reviewing the carrying amount of goodwill on a 
regular basis and only writing down the value of goodwill 
when a permanent diminution in value becomes apparent. 
No amortisation. The company 
7 
capitalises goodwill 
subsequent to its acquisition and it remains on the balance 
sheet unamortised. 
The four main methods identified 1n this study have been 
used as the basis of classification 1n subsequent studies 
relating to goodwill. The current study as well as later 
studies make use of an additional method known as dangling 
debit whereby goodwill is not reported as an asset but as a 
separate deduction from consolidated reserves. 
The study conducted by Gibson and Francis (1975) was later 
extended by Carnegie and Gibson (1987). Carnegie and 
Gibson (1987) examined the accounting practices in relation 
to accounting for goodwill on consolidation by companies in 
the periods before and after the commencement date of 
Australian Accounting Standard 18 (AAS 18). A survey was 
conducted 1n January 1986 of 619 Australian 
companies listed on the Australian Associated 
public 
Stock 
Exchanges. Speculative mining companies were excluded as 
well as those 
trusts. The 
subsequent to 
studies and are 
Carnegie and 
listings which were operating pure ly as 
practices used to write off goodwill 
acquisition were ide ntified by these 
summarised in Table 1. 
Gibson discovered that proceeding 
two 
the 
commencement date of AAS 18 there was a continuation of the 
diversity found a decade earlier. Many companies indicated 
an intention to continue practices contrary to AAS 18. 
Whilst there was a significant level of non-compliance, it 
Table 1 
Practices Used to Write Off Goodwill Subsequent 
to Acquisition 
Wrillen off againstfiiJ 
Type of write-off Consolidated Consolidated 
adjustment used by profit reserves 
companiesfiJ (undistributed 
profits) 
1974 19850 1985b 1974 19850 1985b 
Lump sum 16 15 15 33 15 14 
Systematic (periodic) 14 15 52 8 3 IO 
Directors' discretion 8 II 23 9 8 17 
rrotal 38 41 90 50 26 41 
Percentage 43.20'/o 61.20'/o 68.70'/o 56.80'/o 38.80'/o J 1.30'/o 
Total Number Total Percentage 
1974 1985a 1985b 1974 f985U 1985b 
49 30 29 55.7 44.8 22.1 
22 18 62 25.0 26.9 47.3 
17 19 40 19.3 28.3 30.6 
88 67 131 
10011/o 1000/o 100% 
i) This 1al>lc summarises the write off of goodwill before March 1985 for 56 companies. Five companies used more than one adjustment type to 
write off goodwill. For the indicated policies after March 1985, this table summarises the write off of goodwill for 105 companies. Thirteen 
compariies used more than one type of adjustment to write off goodwill. 
ii) Before March I 985, five companies (including I of the 5 referred to in (i) above) used a combination of accounts (consolidated profit and 
consolidated reserves) to write off goodwill. For the indicated policies after March 1985, ten companies (including 2 of the 13 referred to in 
(i) above) used a combination of accounts (consolidated profit and consolidated reserves) to write off goodwill. 
- Historical data from survey. 
' Indicated oolicy from survev. 
Source: Carnegie and Gibson (1987, p. 8) 
9 
was observed that there was a substantial increase 1n the 
number of companies adopting a method of systematic 
amortisation after the introduction of AAS 18 . 
As a result of their study, Carnegie and Gibson 
(198 7, p. 11) concluded the following: 
It is acknowledged that the adoption by the 
profession of AAS 18 may assist to reduce the 
diversity in accounting for goodwill on 
consolidation. However, the survey has 
identified a high level of non-compliance with 
its requirements. This level of non-compliance 
must hamper the profession's move toward greater 
uniformity in this area. The non-compliance 
identified leads us to conclude that there is 
likely to be considerable discussion and debate 
in relation to AAS 1 8  prior to its approval by 
the Accounting Standards Review Board. 
Kirkness (198 7) examined the goodwill accounting practice s 
of a random sample of companies and attempted to identify 
what impact AAS 1 8  had on their accounting and re porting 
procedures. A sample of 100 industrial and commercial 
companies were randomly selected from the Sydney Stock 
Exchange listing as at March 20, 1 98 5. The financial 
statements of the 100  sample companies were analysed and 
their accounting policie s with respect to goodwill were 
identified for the six year period 1980 to 198 5, being five 
years before and one year after the operative date of the 
standard. 
AAS 1 8  was released 1n March 198 4 and became operative as 
at March 31, 198 5. In May 198 3, Exposure Draft 23 had been 
issued. These two preceding events would have provided 
forewarning of the method proposed by the standard and may 
10 
have created incentives for companies to change their 
goodwill accounting treatment in anticipation of the 
standard's operation. 
Table 2 reveals that in the pre-AAS 1 8  period there was a 
large variety of methods adopted by companies in regards to 
accounting for goodwill. The least common (systematic 
amortisation) was the method ultimately prescribed. 
However, following the introduction of AAS 18 two met hods 
dominated; systematic amortisation and immediate write-off, 
with the former being the most common. As with the study 
conducted by Carnegie and Gibson ( 198 7), it was observed 
that the standard significantly increased the number of 
companies using a method of systematic amortisation, but it 
was equally apparent that there was a significant degree of 
non-compliance with the standard. The majority of 
companies who did not comply with AAS 18 elected to write 
off goodwill immediately. 
Table 3 provides a more detailed 
anticipatory responses to AAS 18 . 
examination of the 
It examines companies 
who changed their goodwill accounting procedures between 
198 2 and 198 3 or between 198 3 and 198 4 .  Table 3 reveals 
that there were 13 changes 1n goodwill accounting methods 
1n 198 4 that may have been induced by anticipation of 
AAS 18. In 198 3 there were 4 changes. 
13 changes 1n method in 198 4 ,  1 0  
In regards to the 
involved the total 
elimination of any goodwill balance 1n the balance shee t. 
Of these, 8 companies were not adopting a method of 
ii 
Ii 
11 
Table 2 
Frequency of Goodwill Accounting Methods 
Method 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Capitalisation as an asset: 
- no amortisation 15 17 12 7 5 2 
(26.8] (28.3] (21.8] (14.9] (9.6] (3.9] 
- unsystematic amortisation 7 6 10 9 7 2 
(12.5] (10.0] (18.2] (19.1] (13.5] (3.9] 
- systematic amortisation 3 3 4 6 7 21 
[5.4] (5.0] (7.3] (12.8] (13.8] [41.2] 
Dangling debit 14 19 19 13 10 4 
[25.0] (31.7] (34.5] [27.7] [19.2] [7.8] 
Immediate write-off 17 15 10 12 23 15 
(30.4] [25.0] (18.2] (25.5] (44.2] (29.4] 
Write-offs under AAS 18 - - - - - 7 
transitional provisions (13.7] 
Companies showing only 
negative goodwill 14 16 13 11 14 11 
Companies showing no goodwill 32 32 37 43 35 39 
Sub-total 102 108 105 101 101 101 
Companies with two methods 2 8 5 1 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note - Numbers in parenthes es are percentages of the total 
of positive go odwill methods us ed in the ye ar. 
Source: Kirkness (1987, p. 50) 
12 
Table 3 
The Nature of Changes in Goodwill Accounting Methods in 
1983 and 1984 
Nature of change 1982-83 1983-84 
Amounts shown as dangling debits written off in full. 2(1) 3(2) 
Amounts shown as asset (unsystematic) written off in full. 1 (1] 5(2) 
Amounts shown as asset (systematic) written off in full. 0 2(1) 
Amounts shown as asset (no amortisation) written off in full. 1 0 
Companies changing from immediate write-off to asset (systematic). 0 3 
Total 4 13 
Numbers in parentheses represent the number of 
companies 1n each class which expressly referred 
to AAS 1 8  as the reason for the change. 
Source: Kirkness (1987, p. SO) 
13 
systematic amortisation 1n relation to goodwill. By 
dispensing with their goodwill, these companies avoided the 
requirement of AAS 18 by not having to make a yearly 
reduction 1n profits for any amounts held when the standard 
came into operation. I t  was noted that only 3 of the 1984 
changes were made specifically to adopt AAS 1 8 .  All of the 
198 3  changes involved 
balance sheet. 
the elimination of goodwill from the 
I n  essence, a significant proportion of the companies with 
positive goodwill balances used the period between the 
release of the Exposure Draft and the operation of the 
standard to arrange their affairs 1n such a way as to 
m1n1m 1se the potential impact of AAS 18. The writing-off 
of any current goodwill balances allowed them to avoid the 
non-tax deductible charges to income 1n subsequent years 
that would be imposed by the standard's amortisation 
requirements. 
A more 1n depth analysis of the actual response of 
companies following the effective date of AAS 18 1S 
provided 1n Table 4. Table 4 concentrates on specific 
changes in goodwill accounting methods by companies between 
1 98 4  and 198 5 .  The extent to which AAS 1 8  has reduced the 
diversity may be assessed by observing whether those 
companies who had been using alternative methods prior to 
198 5  continued to use those alternatives or changed to 
adopt the treatment prescribed by AAS 18 1n 1 98 5 .  I t  can 
be ascertained from the results of the study that there has 
i. 
I' 
14 
Table 4 
1985 Responses to AAS 18 
Method Frequency Companies changing Companies No 1985 
used in 1984 in 1984 to adopt AAS 18 not changing goodwill 
Shown as Transitional 
asset write-off 
Asset 5 2 1 2 -
(no a mortisation) (40.0) (20.0) (40.0) 
Asset 7 3 2 2 -
(unsystematic) (42.9) (28.5) (28.5) 
Dan gling 10 2 4 4 -
debit (20.0] (40.0] (40.0) 
Im mediate 23 7 - 12 4 
write-off (30.4] [52.2) (17.4] 
Total 45 14 7 20 4 
N ote - Numbers in parentheses represent percentages for 
each aeth od. 
Source: Kirkness (1987, p.51) 
'I 
·II �· 
r.•1 
't 
!; 1-.·� ' 
' 
15 
not been an overwhelmingly favourable response to AAS 18 . 
Less than hal f of the companies surveyed changed their 
goodwil l accounting methods to comply with the standard. 
This led Kirkness (198 7, p. 51) to conclude "The diversity 
and controversy which has plagued goodwill accounting seems 
certain to remain". 
The study conducted by Carnegie and Gibson ( 198 7) related 
to the earl y reaction of listed companies to AAS 18 . As a 
result of this, Wil liams and Carnegie (198 9) sought to 
extend the study by exam1n1ng the published accounts of a 
sel ection of listed companies to determine whether the 
goodwil l accounting pol icies reported over the period 198 5-
198 7 became more consistent with the standard' s 
requirements. 
Wil liams and Carnegie randomly selected 75 annual reports 
of Austral ia' s largest 150 listed companies 1n 198 6 and 
examined them to determine their accounting pol icies for 
goodwil l ,, Their results are summarised in Table 5. 
Tabl e 5 reveal s an increased tendency for the surveyed 
companies to adopt policies consistent with the approach 
advocated 1n AAS 18 . Consistent with the move to goodwill 
amortisation, the tendency to use the lump sum write-off 
approach declined during 198 5-198 7. This change is l argely 
reflected 1n the decreased preference to charge the write­
off of goodwill against reserves or undistributed profits. 
Table 5 
Accounting Policies for Goodwill 
1985 1986 1987 
No. (1) 'ri (b) No. (1) % (b) No. (1) 'ii (b) 
Capi1alised as an asset: 
Systematic amortisation 
to income 24 
Write-offs at directors· 
discretion 2 
Lump sum write-off: 
Reserves or 
undistributed profits 10 
Extraordinary item 13 
Operating expense 
Recorded as a deduction 
from shareholders' 
funds ('dangling debit') 
and amortised to 
income 2 
46.2 26 
3.8 2 
19.2 7 
25.0 1 5  
2.0 
3.8 
52 100.0 52 
Policy not recorded nor 
ascertainable 24(c) 
76 
24(c) 
76 
50.0 37 
3.8 2 
13.4 4 
28.8 1 5  
2.0 
2.0 
100.0 59 
.!.?Jd) 
76 
62.7 
3.4 
6.8 
25.4 
1.7 
100.0 
(a) As one company indicated a dual policy, these 52 policies (59 
in 1987) relate to 51 companies (58 in 1987). 
(b) As a percentage of identifiable policies. 
(c) Of these companies, 6 indicated that their accounting policies 
are" . . . in accordance with AASs 
(d) Of these companies, 7 indicated that the policies adopted in the 
accounts are" ... in accordance with AASs . .. ". 
Source: Williams and Carnegie (1989, p. 90) 
16 
17 
Williams and Carnegie (1989) noted that the reported 
results might provide some cheer for the Australian 
profession in its endeavour to regulate this controversial 
issue. They advised that the results needed to be treated 
with caution due to two reasons. Firstly, the sample size 
was limited and was biased toward larger companies. 
Secondly, a number of companies had been identifying and 
recording intangible assets upon acquisition, such as 
mastheads and trademarks, without subsequently amortising 
these assets over their expected useful lives. Williams 
and Carnegie pointed out that this practice overcomes the 
amortisation requirement of AAS 18 , either wholly or partly 
and involves the directors' discretion approach 
accounting for the identified intangibles. 
As a consequence of their study, Williams and Carnegie 
(1989, p. 90-91) concluded the following: 
The criticism of ASRB 1013 needs to be balanced 
with the 1 imi ted evidence by this study of an 
increased acceptance of the systematic 
amortisation approach in accounting for goodwill 
in the period prior to the issue of the approved 
standard. The study's results also indicate some 
support for the write-off of lump sums against 
income. Of course, the lump sum approach 1s 
required in those situations where no probable 
future benefits are evident, as in the case of a 
"bad buy". However. it will be interesting to 
see whether the provisions of ASRB 1013 result in 
the adoption of this approach decreasing in 1988 
published accounts. 
to 
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Pavletich ( 1989) considered the market reaction to AAS 18 
subsequent to it gaining statutory backing through 
ASRB 10 13. As non-compliance with an approved accounting 
standard is significantly more costly than non-compliance 
with a professional standard, firms have become less 
willing to state that they will not comply. Pavletich 
noted that firms have become likely to obtain valuations 
for trademarks, patents and other identifiable intangibles 
since the issue of ASRB 10 13. He also hypothesised that 
the issue of the standard has increased the incentive to 
revalue non-depreciable assets such as land and investments 
to reduce the value that is attributed to goodwill when an 
acquisition is made. 
Christopher ( 1990) examined the accounting policies of 
Perth main-board home-exchange companies in order to 
ascertain the extent of compliance with ASRB 10 13 10 the 
period immediately after its introduction. The annual 
reports of 14 6 companies were examined to assess their 
accounting policies for goodwill. 
The results of the study conducted indicated that there was 
a high level of non-compliance with all of the require ments 
of ASRB 10 13. It was also indicated that it was a 
possibility that a number 6f these companies had breache d 
ASRB 1001 "Accounting Policies Disclosure", which requires 
that when a material change 10 accounting policy occurs, 
the nature, reason and financial effect of the change 1s 
required to be disclosed. Christopher pointed out that if 
. ! 
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companies were using the non-disclosure of the amortisation 
period to adjust the current year's e arnings in order to 
achieve a desired state, this finding could be of material 
consequence. 
In sum, it appeared that the diversity in the accounting 
treatment for goodwill which existed in earlier studies had 
been somewhat reduced. It was noted that there existed an 
alternative form of non-compliance. Whilst this non-
compliance was less controversial, it was indicated that it 
was one which should not be tolerated by accounting 
regulators. 
Goodwin and Harris (1991) point out that one of the most 
controversial issues in the profession is the manner in 
which one should account for intangible assets. Since the 
endorsement of AAS 18 by the ASRB in 1988, the debate has 
centred on identifiable intangibles. The study conducted 
by Goodwin and Harris re views the debate and contributes 
further empirical evidence, relating to both identifiable 
and unidentifiable intangibles, drawn from an examination 
of the annual reports of 90 of the largest publicly listed 
companies in Australia. The study aimed to identify 
changes resulting from compliance with ASRB 1013. 
The results of the study demonstrated that the release of 
ASRB 1013 affected 
goodwill. By 1989, 
accounting practices in respect of 
only a small proportion of the 
companies examined were not complying with the requirements 
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of AAS 1 8  and ASRB 1 0 1 3 . A steady increase during the 
three years covered by the study was noted in the number of 
companies recording amounts for goodwill. An increase was 
also noted 1n the number of companies recording 
identifiable intangibles. 
The ASRB standard appears to have influenced accounting 
policies for  goodwil l  and identifiab le intangib les in most 
of Australia ' s  largest compan i es. The recording of  
identifiab le intangibles have not yet reached " gigantic 
proportions ", but the number 1 S  increasing and a few 
companies recorded amounts that represented a significant 
proportion of their total assets. However, disclosure has 
been inadequate and it is a difficult task to ascertain 
whether 
recorded. 
internally 
2 . 2 Summary 
developed intangi bles have been 
In the pre-standard era a tremendous amount of diversity 
ex i sted 1n accounti ng for goodwi ll. The introduction of  
AAS 18  had the effect of substantia lly increasing the usage 
of systematic amortisation, but, a signi ficant degree of 
non-compliance had been noted. Prima facie, it appears 
that ASRB 1 0 1 3  has reduced the diversity 1n accounting for 
goodwill due to its legal enforceabili ty. Whi le firms have 
become less willing to blatantly state that they will not 
comply, they have deceptively sought measures to overcome 
2 1  
the amortisation re quirement advocated by ASRB 10 13. The 
practices adopted by a number of firms includes the 
ide ntification and re cording of intangible assets upon 
acquisition and the revaluation of non-depreciable assets 
to facilitate the reduction of goodwill upon acquisition. 
Table 6 presents an overview of the previous research 1n 
relation to goodwill. 
�
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Table 6 
An Overv iew of the Pre v ious Re s earch i n  Rel ation to 
Goodwill 
Author 
Pre-stand.vrl Miller (1 973) *Tremendous diversity existed. 
era Gibson and *Five main methods identified. 
Francis (1 975) 
*The least common was the method 
Carnegie and 
Gibson (1 987) ultimately prescribed. 
Kirkness (1 987) 
Period between 
t/Je ,e/ease of Kirkness (1 987) *Significant number of companies 
E023 illld eliminated their goodwill balances to 
t/Je operation minimise the impact of the standard. 
olAAS 18 
.. 
AAS 18 Carnegie and *Two methods dominated: 
Gibson (1 987) 
systematic amortisation 
Kirkness (1 987) 
immediate write-off 
Williams and 
Carnegie (1 989) *Significant degree of non-compliance 
still in existence. 
ASRB 1013 Pavletich (1 989) *Reduced diversity in accounting for goodwill. 
Christopher (1 990) *Firms have become likely to obtain 
Goodwin and valuations for identifiable intangibles. 
Harris (1 991 ) 
*Incentive exists to revalue non-depreciable 
assets. 
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CHAPTER 3 
AN OVERVIEW OP POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY 
Th e s t u d y  e mp l oy s  c on t r a c t i n g  t h e o r y  an d p o l i t i c a l c o s t s  
t h e o r y  t o  f o r mu l at e  h y po t h e s e s  f o r  mana g e r s  c h o i c e  o f  
a c c o un t i n g  m e t h o d s  i n  r e l a t i on t o  a c c o un t i n g  f o r  g o o d w i l l .  
3 . 1  P o s iti ve Ac c ounti ng Theory 
P o s i t i v e  a c c o un t in g  t h e o r y  s u p p l i e s r e s e ar c h e r s  " w i t h a 
u s e f u l  p r e d i c t i v e mod e l  o f  t h e  a c c o un t i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  
u n d e r l y i n g  t h e f in an c i a l  s t a t e m en t s "  ( W a t t s  and Z i mm e rman 
[ 1 9 8 6 , p . 3 5 6 ] ) . B y  u t i l i s in g  t h e  t h e o r y , r e s e a r c h e r s  ar e 
c a p a b l e  o f  r e c o gn i s i n g  " t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  c on t r a c t i n g  an d 
p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s e s  on t h e  c a l c u l a t i on o f  e a rn in g s  an d 
b a l an c e  s h e e t  n umb e r s "  ( W a t t s  and Z i mme rman [ 1 9 8 6 , p . 3 5 6 ] ) .  
M an a g e r s  an d c l a i man t s  on t h e  a s s e t s  o f  a f i r m d i s p l ay 
s u b s t an t i al c on c e rn o v e r  t h e s e l e c t i on o f  a c c o un t in g  
t e c hn i q u e s  d u e  t o  t h e  i mp a c t on t h e  c a s h  f l ow s  o f  t h e  f i rm 
or t h e  w e a l t h of  t h e  p a r t i e s t h a t  c on s t i t u t e  t h e  f i r m 
( W h i t t r e d and Z i mm e r [ 1 9 9 0 ] ) . W h i t t r e d  a n d  Z i mm e r  ( 1 9 9 0 , 
p . 2 1 )  " c h a r a c t e r i s e t h e  c h o i c e o f  a c c o un t i n g  t e c hn i q u e  a s  
b e i n g  e i t h e r  e x  an t e  o r  e x  po s t " . E x  an t e  c h o i c e s  r e f e r  t o  
t h e  s e l e c t i on o f  a c c o un t i n g t e c hn i q u e s  w h e n  a c on t r a c t  1. s 
1n t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  n e g o t i a t i on .  D u e  t o  t h e  e x c e s s i v e  c o s t s  
a s s o c i at e d w i t h s t i p u l a t i n g  a s e t  o f  a c c o un t i n g  m e t h o d s f o r  
a l l po s s i b l e  s i t u a t i on s , c on t r a c t i n g  p ar t i e s  h a v e a 
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tendency to e ntrust management with such choice s. These 
choices are constrained by Generally Acce pted Accounting 
Principles ( GAAP) . Ex post choice s are made subsequent to 
the contracts being put into place and may be subject to 
opportunistic modification. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) point out that ex ante studies 
are more dif ficult to undertake than ex post studie s as 
e f ficient accounting techniques can be expected to dif fer 
amongst firms. 
contingent 
opportunities. 
These e f ficient accounting techniques are 
u pon a fir m's prod uction -inves tment 
This poses a problem to researchers as 
these can be dif ficult to observe. 
di f ficulties associated 
Zimmerman (1990) sugge st 
with 
tha t 
such 
they 
In spite of  the 
studies, Wa tts and 
provide a greater 
capability for understanding accounting. The ex ante model 
concentrate s on the stipulation of an accounting policy 
choice as a part of the bonding and monitoring process to 
decrease the costs of contracting, whilst the ex pos t model 
takes the contracts 1n place 1n a firm as given, and then 
aims to elucidate accounting policy choice as 
opportunistically shifting wealth amongst claimholders of a 
firm. 
Accounting researchers have frequently tested the following 
three e x  post hypotheses that re late to managers ' procedure 
choices : "the bonus plan hypothesis, the debt/equity 
hypothesis, and the size hypothesis" (Watts and Zimmerman 
[ 198 6 , p . 2 4 4 ) ). 
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The earnings-based bonus plan which is part of executive 
compensation schemes, was one type of contract between 
managers and shareholders. As compensation was linked to 
the level of reported earnings, it was hypothesised that 
when these plans were 1n existence, managers would select 
accounting procedures that transferred reported e arnings 
from future periods to present periods. This 1s known as 
the bonus plan hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman [ 1 9 86 ] ) .  
The presence of debt contracting processe s implied that 
operating on behalf of shareholders, had managers 
incentives to transfer wealth from debt holders to 
shareholders. 
covenants, 
procedure s 
they 
which 
As 
had 
managers were 
i ncentives 
allowed them to 
restricted by debt 
to select accounting 
" get around " these 
restrictive covenants. It was hypothes i sed that as a 
firm ' s  leverage increase s (debt-assets), the manager 
chooses accounting procedu res that t ransfe r reported 
This has e arnings from future periods to pre sent periods. 
been called the debt/equity hypothe sis (Watts and Zimmerman 
[ 1 9 86 ] ) .  
Accounting provides information that 1 s  util i sed 1n the 
political process. As the political process 18  a 
competition for wealth transfers, firms that are 
politically sensitive w i ll have a strong i ncenti ve to 
understate their earn ings. The size hypothesis was that 
"the larger the firm, the more likely the manager i s  to 
., 
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choose accounting procedures that de fer re ported earnings 
from current to future periods " (Watts and Z i mmerman 
( 1986, p . 235 ] ) .  
3. 2 Contracting Theory 
An analysis of contracts between manage rs-share holde rs and 
debtholders and between shareholders and managers was 
conducted by Jensen and Meckl ing (1976). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) depict the firm "as a nexus for a set of 
contracting relationships among individuals " (p. 310). 
According to agency theory, contracts between parties to a 
firm are formulated to decre ase the costs associated with 
the unde r lying conflicts of intere st that arise amongst the 
various parties. For example , debt/equity ratios are 
employed in debt contracts to restrict manage rs ability to 
transfe r wealth away from debtholde rs. Also, 1n an attempt 
to m 1n1m1se manager shirking, accounting earnings 
utilised in bonus plans (Watts and Zimme rman ( 1 986 ] ). 
are 
Jensen and Meckl ing' s (19 76) examination of the conf lict 
between manage rs and shareholde rs suggests that managers 
with a low owne rship pe rcentage i n  a firm ' s  residual c l aims 
will have less motiv ation to maximise the value of a firm's 
equity as 
percentage. 
compared to manage rs with a high ownership 
I n  orde r to ensu re sha reholde rs that their 
interests will be safeguarded, manage rs may ente r into a 
contract with shareholde rs providing them with the 
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motivation to maximise the market val ue of the fi rm ' s 
equity . 
The utilisation of restr i ct i ve covenants 1n debt agreements 
to decrease the abi l ity of management to transfer wealth 
away from debtholders has been recogni sed by Jensen and 
Meckl ing (1976) . Their analysis of the managers-
share holders/debtholders conflict suggests that wealth may 
be transferred away from debtholders 1n a number of ways . 
These include management increasing the amount of d i vidends 
pai d  to shareholde r s  by d i sposal of a fi rm ' s  assets, the 
issuance of extra debt that 1s of the same or of a h i gher 
priority , adopting investment projects that possess a 
"highe r var iance distr i buti on "  than was sti pu l ated when the 
debt was i ssued (Jensen and Meckl i ng [ 1976 , p. 336 1 ) , or 
rejecting investment projects w i th a positive net present 
va lue if the benefi ts wou l d  flow to debtholders. I t  1s 
presumed that there is a 
level and bond prices. 
causal link between a firm's debt 
This suggests that there 1s a 
corresponding reduction 1n bond price s as a firm ' s  debt 
level increases. I n  an atte mpt to decrease the age ncy 
costs that arise due to the conflicts of interest , managers 
and shareholders may agree to the i mposit i on of add itional 
debt restrictions. 
Sol i man (1989) points out that managers are provided w i th a 
large number of alternatives within GAAP in  re l ation to the 
selection and applicati on of accounting methods. As a 
res u 1 t of th i s , managers w i 11 have a tendency to u t i  1 i s e 
l 
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those accounting alte rnatives that max imise their 
compensation or loosen the binding effects of debt 
covenants. For examp l e , manage rs may increase their bonus 
payments by se lecting those accounting alte rnatives that 
result in highe r income . 
An ove ral l measure of debt constraints is obtained by the 
debt/equity ratio. Ac cording to Ka lay ( 1 982), firms which 
have highe r debt/equity ratios are more l ike l y  to be c l ose 
to covenant constraints, and the refore will  have a tendenc y 
to se l e c t  ac counting methods that increase income. Watts 
and Zimme rman (19 9 0) point out that the c loser a firm is to 
covenant constraints , the greate r is the possibi lity of a 
covenant vio lation and of encounte ring costs due to 
technical defau l t . Manage rs that utilise income-increasing 
accounting alte rnatives are able to loosen the binding 
effects of debt c onstraints and minimise the costs 
associated with technical defau lt. 
3 . 3  Political Costs Theory 
Soliman (1989) points out that e conomic theories of the 
political process emp loy the se lf-inte rest view which 
infe rs that politicians seek to max i mise their utility. In 
re lation to these theories, the political process is viewed 
as a competition amongst individua ls for wealth transfers. 
Anti-trust actions, increases 1n taxes, or the increased 
regulation of firms or the industries wherein firms 
.
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operate, are all examples of attempted wealth transfers. 
Political costs do not only consist of the wealth transfers 
that occur, but also the costs associated with defending 
such interferences . 
As lobbying and coalescing to affect the political process 
is an expensive exercise, it 1 6  hypothesised that 
politic ians depend upon accounting numbers in an attempt to 
transfer wealth. By way of example, politicians are 
hypothesised to use large profits as an indication of 
monopoly. Accounting numbers are also employed 1 n  the 
establishment of service rates 1n industries that are 
regulated. As a consequence of this, managers of firms 
which are susceptible to potential wealth transfers through 
the political process are hypothesised to select accounting 
methods that alter the political visibility of their firm. 
There i s  a greater likelihood that managers of these firms 
will utilise accounting methods that decrease current­
period earnings and the variance of earnings than managers 
of firms that are not as politically visible. I n  doing 
this, firms can avert some of the attention identified with 
a public perception of an association between high reported 
earnings and monopoly ( Soliman [ 1 9 8 9 ] ) .  
Watts and Zimmerman ( 1 9 7 8 ) argue that large firms are prone 
to excessive regulation and increases in taxes due to their 
political sensitivity. The reporting of higher income by 
large firms attracts undesirable attention from regulators, 
hence, managers of these firms have a tendency to select 
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ac counting methods that l ower current-period income. 
Fol l owing this reasoning, it is e x pected that smal l firms 
are le s s  political l y  vul nerable and hence le s s  prone to 
wealth transfers through the political proce s s  as compared 
with large firms. As a re sult of this , managers of s mal l 
firms wou ld not be e x pe cted to be as concerned about 
political costs as managers of large firms wou ld whe n 
se lecting among accounting methods. 
A s tudy conducted by Wong (1988) supplies persuasive 
evidence on the significance of political costs. According 
to W o n g  ( 1 9 8 8 ) , e xport tax credits became a politica lly 
sensitive matter 1n New Zealand in the ear l y  1980 s and this 
affe cted the way in which companie s accounted for them. In 
ac c ounting for e xport tax credits , companie s 
credited them to sale s or to income tax e xpense. 
A s  a consequence of his study, Wong ( 1988 , p. 5 0) 
c onc l uded the fol lowing : 
either 
An ana l ysis  of the news media reports over this 
period s ugge sts that companie s receiving material 
amounts of e x port tax credits and , hence , having 
low tax rates are frequentl y  criticised f or not 
bearing their s hare of the tax burden. Big 
companie s ,  because of their vis ibility, are als o  
the foca l  point of attention. To minimise public 
antagonis m  toward them, it is hypothesised that 
c ompanie s with the se attribute s adopt the "credit 
to sale s "  method of accounting for ex port tax 
credits, thus raising their re ported tax rates to 
a leve l  comparable to firms that are not as 
political l y  sensitive. The results are 
consistent with this hypothe sis. 
3 1  
Whil st po l it i cal costs are one of the most s igni ficant 
determinants of accounting po l icy choice, it i s  one of the 
least understood . Whilst it appears that the evidence 
supports that larger firms select income-decreasing 
accounting methods , care is re quired to be exercise d  1n 
construing this as evidence that firms that are polit i cally 
sensit i ve favour income-de creasi ng accounting methods. 
Political costs may be a function of a large number of 
factors of which size may onl y  constitute one. By way of 
example, the type of industry may be an important factor 1n 
determining the leve l  of pol itical costs ( Whittred and 
Zimmer [ 1 9  9 0 ] )  . 
Holthausen and Leftwich ( 1 9 83 ) argue that the causal l ink 
betwee n  po litical visibility and accounting choices is more 
conjectural than other causa l links in the account i ng 
choices literature as it is not de pendant on any expl icit 
contracts to whi ch the firm 1s a party. The link 1s a 
result of the 
parties usua l l y  
politicians and 
p . 88 ) ) .  
usage of " firms ' accounting numbers by 
considere d e xterna l to the firm, e. g. , by 
voters" (Holthausen and Leftwich [ 1 9 83 , 
The accounting choices literature has not util ised direct 
measures of pol itica l costs as sensitivity to pol itica l 
costs is not capable of being measured accurately enough to 
be specifie d in any mode l e mpl oyed to ascertain the 
economic de te rmin ants o f  a ccount in g  ch oi ce s. 
Alternative ly , firm size, market power, and capital 
'! 
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i ntens i ty are s ome of the factor s  that have been empl oyed 
as surrogates for pol itical v i sibi l ity (So l iman [ 1 9 8 9 ] ) .  
3. 4 Manager i al Ownersh i p  
Pama ( 1 9 80 ) argues that manager s  w i th low o r  no owner s h i p  
interest appear to d i s p lay more concern than owner-manager s  
to pos s ib l e  measures of managerial  per formance. The 
rat iona l e  under lying thi s  type of argument i s  that 
profes s ional manager s  exhibit greater concern 1n relat i on 
to the worth of thei r human capital in the manager ia l  
labour market and i n  res pect o f  the i r  bonus payments .  
The degree of manager ial  owner s hip 1s able to be util i sed 
as an ind i rect measure of a management's wea l th ef fect 
arguments.  In res pect of  any gi ven firm, the greater 
management's proportional owner s h i p ,  the greater shou l d  be 
the manager's concern in re lation to stock price movements 
wh i ch i ndicate the firm ' s  real economic per formance. Where 
manager s  have a low or no owner ship interest, they are more 
l i kely to be concerned with earnings as compensation plans 
are like ly to be emp loyed to decrease the agency conf licts 
of interest (Soliman [ 1 9 8 9 ] ) . Sol iman ( 1989) notes that 
the accounti ng choices l iterature is dependant on thes e 
arguments and hypothesises that managers with l ow or no 
ownership interest are more l i kely to select income-
i ncreas ing accounting method s as  compared to manager s  w i th 
a large ownership interest . 
'I 
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Dhal iwa 1, Salamon and Smith ( 1 982) discovered that a 
negative association between managerial ownership and firm 
size is e xpected being that managerial ownership interest 
is inclined to be greater in small than in large firms. 
There fore, this implies that small firms are more inclined 
to be owner-controlled than are large firms. Dhaliwal e t  
al. ( 1982 )  argue that i f  accounting numbers are e mployed as 
a performance measure, then " management controlled firms 
are more likely than owner controlled firms to adopt 
accounting methods which result 1n increased or early 
reported 
• II earnings (Dhaliwal et al. [ 1 982 , p . 52 ] ) . 
Alternatively, managers of small firms who have high levels 
of stock ownership are more inclined to select income­
decreasing accounting methods. 
3 . 5  Implications for the Research 
A vast amount of research has been conducted to explain why 
firms select certain accounting methods as compared to 
others. By utilising contracting theory, political costs 
theory, and other economic variables, models have been 
formulated 
different 
to differentiate between 
accounting alternatives 
transactions and events . 
firms 
for 
selecting 
comparable 
The positive accounting theory l i terature has concentrated 
on the cash flow effects of accounting methods as the 
incentive for management to select from alternative 
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accounting methods. Managers wil l  have a tendency to 
uti lise those accounting methods that enabl e  them to l oosen 
the binding effects of financial constraints, increase 
their compensation , 
costs. 
and reduce the l eve l of pol i t i ca l  
Positive accounting theory is being util ised i n  the study 
to predict and explain managers choice of accounting 
methods in relation to accounting for goodwil l  in the pre­
standard era. 
CHAPTER 4 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
4. 1 Ex ante Hypothesis 
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Accounting choices in the context of costly contracting may 
be described as either e x  ante or ex post (Whittred and 
Z i mm e r [ 1 9 9 0 ] ) • The choice may be ex  ante 1n that the 
choice of technique 1s agreed 
first put in place. 
4 . 1 . 1  Industry Hypothesis 
The following h ypothesis for 
upon when the contracts are 
the association between 
industry classification and the choice of accounting method 
is stated in its null form : 
H l :  There is no association between industry classification 
and the choice of accounting methods by firms . 
H l l : There is no association between industry 
classification and the choice of method in accounting for 
goodwill by firms. 
• 
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4 . 2  Bx post Hypotheses 
Bx post hypotheses have bee n  commonly teste d in the 
accounting literature (Watts and Zimmerman ( 1986) ) and this 
se ction e xamines their possible relationship to 
manageme nt ' s choice of method in accounting for goodwill. 
4 . 2 . 1  Debt Hypothesis 
Upon conducting a survey of Australian company trust dee ds , 
Whittre d and Zimmer ( 1986) reporte d that a l arge numbe r of 
cove nant restrictions were expresse d in terms of accounting 
ratios and found that there was significant variation in 
the dee ds with respect to the type of debt. Nearly all of 
them spe cifie d a limit for total liabilities as a 
perce ntage of total tan gible assets whilst interest 
coverage restrictions were only foun d to exist for some 
debe nture issues. Limits on both secure d liabilities an d 
prior charges were expresse d 1n terms of a perce ntage of 
total tan gible assets, with the latter only common to 
debe nture dee ds. Since all of these constraints exclude 
intangibles, the choice of accounting for goodwill will not 
affect the asset base of any ratio. 
I n  re gard to interest cover restrictions, the accountin g 
policy choice is capable of being explaine d by the 
possibility of a breach of that constraint (Whittre d and 
Z i mm er [ 198 6 ] ) . I nterest coverage ratios are usual l y  
• 
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stated as net profit over a nnua l interest charge and is 
applicable only at the time of a further debt issue. In 
spite of intangibles being e xcluded from the asset base of 
leverage ratios, Whittred and Zimmer note that any 
amortisation of an intangible 1s not usually added back to 
net profit for purposes of the interest coverage 
restriction. 
Pavletich ( 19 89 )  points out that as goodwill is generally 
e xcluded from asset based ratios 1n Australian debenture 
trust deeds, the typical debt hypothesis_ with a leverage 
variable will not apply. The only ratio that the 
accounting choice for goodwill has an e f fect on is an 
interest coverage constraint. As the interest coverage 
constraint only applies to certain debenture trust deeds 
and 1n the year of a proposed debt issue, an interest 
coverage ratio may not be a good indicator of manage ment ' s  
propensity to avoid 
amortisation. 
adopting a method of systematic 
If a firm has a debenture trust deed 1n place and may 
require future debenture i ssues, adopting a method of  
syste matic amortisation would be undesirable due to its 
e f fect of  reducing income 1n the current year and also in 
the year of possible further debt issues. Instead of being 
locked into a syste matic income reducing alternative, these 
firms would h a v e  a tendency to either maintain their 
goodwill balance without charging against income or write 
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• 
off the entire amount in a period that does not impact on 
an interest coverage restriction . 
In  contrast to an interest coverage ratio as an explanatory 
variable, a proxy for the presence of public debenture s 
would be expected to enable a more powerful test of the 
impact of debt covenants on accounting choice. As a result 
of this, two hypotheses using both proxies are state d .1n 
their alternate forms. 
H 2 : Managers of firms who choose income-increasing 
accounting methods are more likely to have lower interest 
coverage ratios than those who choose income-decreasing 
accounting methods. 
H2 1 :  Managers of firms who capitalise goodwill and allow it 
to remain on the balance sheet unamortise d or treat 
goodwill as a dangling debit, are more likely to have lowe r 
interest coverage ratios than those who adopt a method of 
immediate write -off, systematic amortisation, or 
unsystematic amortisation . 
H3 : Managers of firms who choose income -increasing 
accounting methods are more likely to have public 
debentures on issue than those who choose income-decreasing 
accounting methods. 
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H31: Managers of firms who capitalise goodwill and allow it 
to remain on the balance shee t unamortised or treat 
goodwill as a dangling debit, are more likely to have 
public debentures on issue than those who adopt a me thod of 
immediate write-of f, systematic amortisation, or 
unsystemat ic amortisation. 
4 . 2. 2  Size Hypothesis 
The association of political costs with political 
visibility and management incentives have been frequently 
tested by researchers with the results of the size 
hypothesis be ing generally consistent. Watts and Zimmerman 
( 1986) note that to the extent that a firm is subject to a 
potential wealth transfer via the political process, its 
manager is hypothesised to select accounting procedures 
that reduce the transfer. It 1 s  generally pos tulated that 
the accounting procedure adopted will be income-decrea s ing 
in an e f fort to reduce the politi cal vis ibil ity of the 
f irm . 
The following hypothesis for the association between firm 
size and the choice of accounting method is suggested in 
its alternate form : 
H4: Firms that choose income-increasing accounting methods 
are more likely to be of a smaller size than t hose f irms 
who choose income-decreasing accounting methods. 
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H41:  Firms that capitalise goodwill and allow it to re main 
on the balance sheet unamortised or treat goodwill as a 
dangling debit, are more likely to be of a smaller size 
than those firms who adopt a method of  immediate write -of f, 
systematic amortisation, or unsystematic amortisation. 
4. 3 Accounting Policy Hypotheses 
This section aims to determine whether there 1 6  a 
difference 1n the size and the interest coverage ratios of 
firms that use single and firms that use dual policies of 
accounting for goodwill . 
Single policies of accounting for goodwill may either be 
income -increasing or income-decreasing. Single income-
increasing policies include the following : capitalisation 
of goodwill and allowing it to remain on the balance sheet 
unamortised, treating goodwill as a dangling debit, or the 
adoption by a firm of a combination of these two methods. 
Single income-decreasing policies include the following :  
immediate write-off of goodwill, systematic amortisation, 
unsystematic amortisation, or the adoption by a firm of a 
combination of any two of these methods. 
Dual policies are defined as a combination of two methods 
of accounting for goodwill, one being income-increasing and 
the other income-decreasing. The motivations of firms 
adopting dual policies 1s unclear. Even though the net 
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e f f ect may be income -increasing or income -decreasing, it 1s 
believed that the intentions of managers of these firms are 
dif f erent than those who adopt outright income-increasing 
or incom e -decreasing m ethods of accounting for goodwill. 
I f  firms have had a "bad " year they may use an income ­
increasing m e thod o f  accounting for goodwill to loosen the 
binding e f f ects of debt covenants and to increase 
compensation in a manager-controlled firm. I t  1s expected 
that they would not use a dual policy of accounting for 
goodwill. Alternatively, if profits are " large ",  managers 
of firms may choose an income-decreasing method and write 
o f f  their entire goodwill balance. Also, large firms may 
select an income -decreasing method in an attempt to reduce 
their political visibility. 
The following hypotheses for the association betwe en 
accounting policy choice and the interest coverage ratios 
of firms are suggested in their null form : 
H S : There 1s no dif ference 1n the interest coverage ratios 
of  firms that use single income-increasing and firms that 
use dual policies of accounting for goodwill . 
H6 : There 1s no dif ference in the interest coverage ratios 
of firms that use single income -decreasing and firms that 
use dual policies of accounting for goodwill. 
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The following hypotheses for 
and 
the 
the 
association between 
accounting policy choice s 1 z e of firms are 
suggested in their null form : 
H 7 :  There 1s no difference 1 n  the size of firms that use 
single income -increasing and firms that use 
of accounting for goodwill. 
dual policies 
H8: There is no difference 1. n  the size of firms that use 
single income -decreasing and firms that use dual policies 
of accounting for goodwill. 
CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHOD 
5 . 1  Da t a  a nd S a ap l e  S e l e c t i on 
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T h e  t i me p e r i o d 1977-1979 w a s  s e l e c t e d 1 n  o r d e r t o  e x a m i n e  
t h e  d i v e r s i t y t ha t  e x i s t e d  1 n  a c c o u n t i n g f o r  g o o dw i l l  i n  
t h e  p r e - s t a nd a r d  e r a . E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  2 3  " A c c o u n t i n g f o r  
G o o dw i l l "  wa s i s s u e d  i n  M a y  198 3  wh i l s t  AAS 1 8  w a s  i s s u e d  
i n  M a r c h  198 4 .  AAS 1 8  b e c ame e f f e c t i v e  f o r  a l l  b a l a n c e  
d a t e s  o n  o r  a f t e r  31 M a r c h  198 5 . I t  wa s g i v e n  s t a t u t o r y  
b a c k i n g  t h r o u g h  ASRB 1 013 wh i c h b e c ame e f f e c t i v e  f o r  a l l  
b a l a n c e  d a t e s  o n  o r  a f t e r  19 J u n e  1 98 8  ( r e f e r  t o  A p p e n d i x  1 
f o r  a c h r on o l o g i c a l  h i s t o r y o f  g o o d w i l l ) . I n  view o f  t h i s , 
i t  c a n  be j u s t i f i a b l y  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  p e r i o d s e l e c t e d  i s  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  e a r l y  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e r e  we r e  n o  " r u l e s " 
g o v e r n i n g t he t r e a t m e n t  o f  goodwi l l  o r  a n y  o t he r  f a c t o r s  
p r e s e n t , f o r  e x amp l e  a p e n d i n g  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t , t h a t  wo u l d  
h a v e  a s i g n i f i c a n t  i n f l u e n c e  o n  t h e  w a y  1 n  wh i c h f i rm s  
a c c o u n t e d  f o r  g o o d w i l l . A t h r e e  y e a r  p e r i o d w a s  s e l e c t e d  
i n  o r d e r  t o  a l l ow c o mp a r i s o n s  amo n g s t t h e  ye a r s  un d e r  s t udy 
f o r  the s amp l e  pub l i c  c om p a n i e s  and to p e r m i t a r i c h e r  
a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  may i n f l u e n c e  a f i r m i n  i t s 
a p p r o a c h  t o  a c c o u n t i n g  f o r  g o o dw i l l . 
A l i s t  w a s  o b t a i n e d  f r om t h e  Au s t r a l i a n G r a d u a t e  S c ho o l  o f  
M a n a g em e n t  ( AG S M ) o f  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  o n  t h e i r  
collection for the period 19 7 7 -1980. 
total of 7 49 companies and trusts. 
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This comprised of a 
As the study is 
concerned with company accounting practice, the 15 listings 
that were operating as trusts were e xcluded. Also, 
companies for whom annual reports were not present for the 
full period under study were e xcluded. These 133 companies 
had been delisted or did not fall into the top 500 listings 
with respect to market capitalisation. The criteria for 
inclusion in the AGSM Annual Report File in any one year 1s 
that the listing be amongst the top 500 with regard to 
market capitalisation (M. McDonnell , AGSM Librarian , July 
199 2 ,  personal communication) . 
The 19 7 7  annual reports of 601 companies were examined to 
ascertain if they had goodwill. 
companies (42%)  had goodwill. 
It was determined that 2 54 
These compan ies industry 
sub-groups were ascertained by reference to the Australian 
Stock Exchange Journal and a check was made to determine 
whether the companies were operating 1n the same industry 
for the sample period. 
identification of the 
In order to permit 
relationship betwee n 
a clear 
industry 
classification and accounting choice , se ve n companies that 
had changed industries were e xcluded. Five companies which 
undertook a change of name during the sample period were 
not e xcluded as they were continuously listed and were 
operating within the same industry. 
The 247 companies that had bee n placed into their industry 
sub-groups resulted 1n a total of 50 sub-groups being 
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represented. The industry c lassification groupings i n  the 
Austral ian Stock Exchange Journal were util ised in order to 
ascertain the number of companies 10 each industry 
cl assification (refer to Appendix 2 ) .  This resu lted i n  a 
total of 17 industry cl assification groupings. 
The sample comprises of a tota l of 247 companies 1n 17 
different industries for the ful l three year period. 
Tabl e  7 provides an overview of the samp le se lection whilst 
Table 8 shows the composition of the samp le by industry 
cl assification. The t ota 1 samp 1 e grouped by industry 
classification is shown in Appendix 3.  
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Table 7 
Overview of Sample Selection 
Description No. 
AGSM Australian Annual Report File 1 977-1 980 749 
Elimination of trusts [1 5] 
Companies missing annual reports [1 33] 
Companies eliminated because have no goodwill [347] 
Companies eliminated because of change in industry [7] 
Total 247 
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Table 8 
Composition of the Sample by Industry Cla s s ification 
Industry Name of industry No. Percentage 
classification group 
code 
1 Banks. Insurance 
and Trustees 8 3.24 
2 Finance and Investment 1 1  4.5 
3 Pastoral 6 2.42 
4 Transport 6 2.42 
5 Retailers and Merchants 20 8.1 
6 Media and Other Services 30 1 2. 1 4 
7 Food, Drink and Tobacco 38 1 5.4 
8 Textiles and Clothing 6 2.42 
9 Chemicals. Glass. Rubber 1 5  6.1 
10 Steel and Engineering 23 9.3 
1 1  Builders' Suppl iers 27 1 0.93 
12 Developers and Building 
Contractors 1 0  4 
1 3  Electrical and Durables 6 2.42 
1 4  Automotive 1 5  6.1 
1 5  Paper and Paper Products 3 1 .21 
1 8  Metals and Minerals 21 8.5 
1 9 Oil and Gas 2 0.8 
Total 247 100 
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5 . 2  The Measureaent of Variables 
5 . 2 . 1  The Measurement of the Dependent Variable 
The dependent variabl e 1n t his s tudy 1s managemen t s ' c hoic e  
of method in ac counting f o r  goodwill. I f  a c ompany selec t s  
a specific met hod of a c c ounting f or goodwil l in preference 
to another , it will have a tendenc y to either inc rease or 
dec rease repor t ed earnings . Hen ce ,  in s tead of having a 
continuous dependent variabl e ,  this s tudy utilises a 
dichotomous dependent variable. 
The f ol lowing are t reat ed as income-inc reasing method s : The 
capital isation of goodwil l and al l owing it to remain on the 
balance s heet unamor tised, and t reating goodwil l as a 
dangling debit.  The fol l owing are t reat ed as in come 
dec reasing methods : Systematic amortisation , unsy s t emati c  
amor tisation , and immediate write-of f.  A value of  1 is 
as signed to each of the income-inc reasing methods whilst a 
value of 2 1s assigned to each of the in come-dec reasing 
methods. 
Managemen t s '  choice of method 1n a c c ounting for goodwil l 1 s  
inves tigat ed b y  indust ry classification and size. The 
ac coun ting choices are impor tant 1n the int erpretation of 
the t es t s  which rela te to the association bet ween indus t ry 
clas sification or size and the method of ac count ing for 
goodwill by the sample companies. 
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5 . 2 . 2  The Measureaent of the Independent Variables 
( 1) Debentures (DEBS) 
The presence of debentures on issue are determined from 
compan i e s  annual reports . DEBS are assi gned a value of 1 
for presence and O for absence. 
(2) I nterest Coverage Ratio (INTCOV ER) 
The interest c o v e r a g e  ratio is calculated as: 
operating profit before tax + interest expense 
interest expense 
This rati o  is an i ndication of an ent i ty ' s  capabi l i ty to 
meet periodic interest payments from current profi ts .  
Income taxes and 
operati ng profit 
i nterest expense 
1n the numerator 
are added back to 
as the ratio 1 s  a 
measure of profits that are ava i lable to pay the inte rest 
charges .  
(3) Size (SIZ E) 
In this study, si ze is utilised as a proxy for political 
costs . The variable employed to measure firm size is total 
assets. 
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(4) Industry ( IND) 
There are seventeen industries that are represented in t his 
analysis: Banks, Insurance and Trustees ; Finance and 
Investment ; Pastoral : Transport :  Re tailers and Merchants : 
Med ia and O ther Services ;  Food, Drink and Tobacco ; Textiles 
and Clothing ; Chemicals, Glass , Rubber ;  Steel and 
Engineering ; Builders' Suppliers ; Developers and Building 
Contract �rs ; Electrical and Durables ;  Automotive ; Paper and 
Paper Products ; Me tals and Minerals ; Oil and Gas. 
5 . 3  Analytical Procedures 
All of the following stated analytical procedures were 
conducted separately for each of the years under study 
( 1977 - 1979) . In order to be included i n  the sample tha t  
was selected in 1977, firms were required to have goodwill 
in the ir account s. However, 1n 1978 and 1979 , some firms 
had no goodwill in their accounts. As a resul t of this, 
they were excluded from the statistical tests . In 1 9  7 8 
t here were 27 firms excluded on this basis , whereas 1n  1979 
there were 4 1  firms. 
A number of firms did not permit the calculation of an 
interest coverage ratio as they had no interest e xpense. 
These firms were excluded from the t - tests that tested the 
difference in t he interest coverage ratios be tween firms. 
5 1  
In 19 7 7  there were 15 firms excluded on this basis, 13 
firms in 19 78 , and 11 firms in 19 79 . 
The frequency of income-increasing and income-decreasing 
methods adopted by the seventeen industry groups 1 6  
reported and the percentage within an industry that adopt 
income-increasing and income-decreasing methods. Where 
there is a tendency for a certain industry to adopt a 
particular method of 
elaboration is provided. 
accounting for goodwill, further 
In order to test whether there is a difference in the 
frequency 
methods 
of 
adopted 
income-increasing 
by firms as 
and income-decreasing 
a result of industry 
classification, a chi-square test was performed for the s1x 
industry groups which contain 20 or more firms. Davis and 
Cosenza ( 1988) point out that certain data requirements are 
required to be met before certain procedures can 
appropriately be used in a study. This applies in the 
current study in relation to the chi-square test performed 
to test the association between industry classification and 
the choice of accounting method . One of the assumptions 
underlying the chi-square test 1 8  that the expected 
frequencies in the analysis must be greater than 5 in each 
cell . As a result of this , the industry groups which 
contain less than 20 firms were not included as there are 
not sufficient numbe rs on which to draw valid conclusions 
based on the statistical test. 
52 
A t-test was performed to test the difference in the 
interest coverage ratios of firms that use income-
increasing and firms that use income-decreasing methods of 
accounting for goodwill. Descriptive statistics for 
interest coverage were computed for each industry group. 
In order to test whether there is a difference in the 
frequency of income-increasing and income-decreasing 
met hods adopted by firms as a result of the presence of 
public debentures on issue , a chi-square test was 
performed. 
A t-test was performed to test the difference in the size 
of firms that use income-increasing and firms that use 
income-decreasing methods of accounting for goodwill. 
Descriptive statistics 
industry group. 
for size were computed for each 
T-tests were performed to test whether there is a 
difference in the interest coverage ratios of firms that 
use single income-increasing or income-decreasing and 
firms that use dual policies of accounting for goodwill. 
Also, t-tests were performed to test whether there i s  a 
difference in the size of firms that use single income-
increasing or income-decreasing and firms that use dual 
policies of accounting for goodwill. 
..,..,. _  (1 
CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6 . 1  Sample Profile 
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Table 9 presents the frequency of goodwil l  accounting 
methods adopted by the 24 7 firms in the samp le. A l arge 
number of firms did not c l early indicate the method 
employed 1n accounting for goodwil l .  I n  a number of 
instances it was necessary to examine company annual 
re ports outside the period designate d for study in order to 
ascertain the method of accounting for goodwil l. With the 
exce ption of the immediate write-off of goodwil l, there was 
little  variation 1n the frequency of goodwil l accounting 
methods adopte d by firms over the period 1977-1979. This 
conforms to what was expected as the study dea l s  with 
accounting for goodwil l in the pre-standard era where there 
were no "rules "  governing its treatment, or any other 
factors present that wou l d  have a significant influence on 
the way in which firms accounted for goodwil l .  Due to the 
little variation throughout the period , on ly the year 1977 
is discussed in detail. 
For the year of 1977 , the most common methods were the 
capitalisation of goodwi l l and al lowing it to remain on the 
ba lance sheet unamortised (31.98%) and treating goodwill as 
a dangling debit (25 .1%) .  Firms may choose to adopt 
Table 9 
Frequency of Goodwill Account ing Methods for the 
Period 197 7 - 1979 
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income-increasing methods as the y 
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loosen the binding 
e f fects of debt covenants and may have the e f fect of 
increasing compensation in manager-controlled firms. 
The i mm e d i a t e w r i t e -of f of good w i 1 1  ( 13 • 7 7 % ) w a s the n e x  t 
most popular method. Although this is an income-decreasing 
method, firms may choose to write of f their goodwill in a 
"good " year when profits are large. This would allow firms 
to avoid the non-tax deductible charges to profit in 
subsequent years. Alternatively, large firms may select an 
income-decreasing method in an attempt to reduce their 
political visibility. The least common method was 
systematic amortisation (4. 86%) which is not surprising 
considering its e f fect on income. A total o f  1 2  . 15% o f  
firms adopted a method o f  unsyste matic amortisation. There 
were 30 firms ( 1 2. 14%) in the sample that used two methods 
of accounting for goodwill. Of these 30 firms, 3 ( 1 . 2 1 %) 
adopted methods which were both income-increasing, 8 
(3. 24%) methods which were both income-decreasing, and 19 
(7. 69%) adopted a combination of income-increasing and 
income-decreasing methods. 
A comparison was made between the current study ( f or the 
year o f  1977) and Kirkness ( 1987) f ollowing the operative 
date o f  AAS 18 in March 1:985. In the current study, the 
majority o f  firms choose methods that were income-
increasing, whereas Kirkness ( 1987) f ound that the two 
dominant methods were systematic amortisation (4 1. 2 %) and 
the immediate write-o f f  of goodwill (29. 4 %) . Another major 
dif ference between the two studies is the much larger 
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percentage of firms (1 2.14% as compared to 1%)  1n the pre-
standard 
goodwill. 
era adopting two me thods of accounting for 
Tables 1 0 , 1 1 , and 1 2  present the frequency of goodwill 
accounting me thods by indust ry group for the period 1 9 77-
1 9 79 .  An examination of these tables reveals that for the 
majority of industry groups , there is no particular me thod 
of accounting for goodwill that most of the firms 1n an 
industry adopt. 
In  order to state that a certain industry has a tendency to 
adopt a particular me thod of accounting for goodwill , three 
criteria were required to be me t. Firstly , the method must 
have been adopted by the largest percentage of firms within 
an industry group , secondly , the percentage of firms must 
be at leas t 40%,  and thirdly , the two previously stated 
criteria must be me t 1n each of the three years under 
study. There were four industry groups that had a tendency 
to adopt a particular me thod of accounting for goodwill. 
Banks, Insurance and Trustees (01), Re tailers and Merchants 
(05) , and Media and Other Services (06) al l capitalised 
goodwill and allowed it to remain on the balance sheet 
unamortised .  Texti les and Clothing (08) tre ated goodwil l 
as a dangling debit . 
Table 10 
Frequency of Goodwill Accounting Methods by Industry Group for 197 7  
Industry Dangling No Unsystematic Systematic lrrwnediate Two methods 
code debit amortisation amortisation amortisation wrlM>ff incorM-lncr. 
No. X No. X No. "' No. "' No. X No. X ·-- --
1 0 4 50 1 12.15 0 2 215 0 
2 3 27.3 1 9.1 2 18.2 1 9.1 2 18.2 1 9.1 ··- · ··-···· -- ·- -··� - - ···-�·--·-
1 16.7 2 33.3 1 16.7 0 2 33.3 0 
4 0 1 16.7 I 16.7 0 2 -� 0 -- - -· ----· --- - ·-·--
4 20 9 45 I 5 0 5 215 0 
I 3 10 14 46.7 2 6.7 3 10 2 6.7 I 3.3 
·-�· 
10 26.3 16 42.1 5 13.2 0 3 7.9 0 ·------ ·--- -·-
3 50 I 16.7 0 1 16.7 0 0 
9 3 20 1 6.7 2 13.3 1 8.7 3 20 I 6.7 
10 4 17.4 7 30.4 5 21.7 I 4.3 3 13.04 0 
n 9 33.3 8 29.83 I 3.7 I 3.7 5 18.5 0 ·---
4 40 3 30 I 10 I 10 0 0 
13 2 33.3 0 2 33.3 0 2 33.3 0 
14 7 48.7 4 28.7 4 26.7 0 0 0 
115 I 33.3 I 33.3 0 0 I 33.3 0 • 7 33.3 7 33.3 2 u 2 9.15 2 u 0 
19 I 50 0 0 I 50 0 0 
Note 1 - Refer to Appendix 2 for industry codes. 
Two methods Combination of 
riconi.decr. lncomHlcr. 
& lncom&-decr. 
No. X No. 
0 1 12.5 
1 9.1 0 �·- ·-�- ··--�---·- --·-
0 0 
0 2 33.3 --·--·-- --
I 5 0 
3 10 2 6.7 
I 2.6 3 7.9 
0 1 16.7 
2 13.3 2 13.3 
0 3 13.04 
0 3 111 
0 I 10 
0 0 
0 0 - --
0 0 
0 I 4.7 
0 0 
Note 2 - Due to rounding differences , percentages aay not su• exactly 
to 100 . 
Total 
8 
--·
6 
6 
20 
6 
15 
23 
27 
10 
8 
3 
21 
2 
m 
00 
If) 
Tabl e  11 
Frequency of Goodwil l  Accounting Methods by Industry Group for 1978 
lndultry Danging No lnystematlc Systematic lnllledlate 
code debit amortisation amortisation amortlsallon wrl6-0lf 
No. " No. " No. " No. " No. " 
t 0 3 42.9 0 1 14.3 1 14.3 
2 4 40 1 10 2 20 0 1 10 
3 1 16.7 1 16.7 1 16.7 0 2 33.3 
 0 1 20 1 20 0 2 40 
15 3 20 8 40 1 8.7 0 3 20 
I 4 13.8 14 48.3 1 3.4 4 13.8 1 3.4 
7 7 20.8 14 41.2 4 11.8 2 15.9 2 u 
8 3 l50 1 16.7 0 0 0 • 3 215 1 8.3 2 18.7 2 18.7 1 8.3 • 8 28.1 15 217 15 217 0 2 8.7 
n 8 27.3 7 31.8 1 u 2 9.1 1 4.5 
12 15 155.8 2 22.2 1 Ill 1 Ill 0 
13 2 40 0 2 40 0 1 20 
M 6 40 4 26.7 4 28.7 0 1 8.7 
115 1 ISO 0 0 0 0 • 15 27.8 8 33.3 2 Ill 2 Ill 2 Ill 
t9 1 l50 0 0 1 l50 0 
Note 1 - Refer to Appendix 2 for industry codes. 
nvo fflllhods Two methodl  Combination of 
lncomHlcr. lncomMlecr. lncomHlcr. 
& lncomMlecr. 
No. " No. " No. " 
0 1 14.3 1 14.3 
1 10 1 10 0 
0 0 1 16.7 
0 0 1 20 
0 0 2 13.3 
1 3.4 3 10.34 1 3.4 
0 3 8.8 2 15.9 
0 1 16.7 1 16.7 
1 8.3 0 2 18.7 
0 0 15 217 
0 0 15 22.7 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 ISO 
0 0 1 u 
0 0 0 
Note 2 - Due to rounding differences , percentages may not su• exactly 
to 100. 
Total 
7 
10 
8 
15 
II 
29 
34 
8 
t2 
23 
22 
9 
15 
ti 
2 
18 
z 
.221 
Table 12 
Preguency of Goodwil l Accoun t i ng Methods by Indus try Group for 1979 
Industry Danging No �ematlc � lmmeclate 
code debit llfflOl'tlsatio amortiNtlon amortisation wrle-off 
No. " No. " No. " No. " No. " 
1 0 4 81.7 0 1 18.7 1 18.7 
z 2 28.8 2 28.8 2 28.8 0 0 
3 1 2G 1 2G 0 0 1 2G 
4 0 1 20 1 20 0 2 40 
8 4 30.8 7 53.8 1 7.7 0 0 • 4 14.3 12 42.9 1 3.8 3 10.7 2 7.1 
1 8 23.5 n 32.4 4 11.8 4 11.8 2 u 
I 3 80 1 20 0 0 0 
9 2 •.2 1 9.1 2 .a 1 9.1 2 .a 
to 8 38.4 4 •.2 4 .a 0 3 13.8 " 8 27.3 8 27.3 2 9.1 1 4.!I 1 4.!I 
12 4 40 3 30 1 10 1 to 0 
13 1 2G 0 2 50 0 1 2G 
M 4 28.8 4 28.8 5 3G.7 0 0 • 1 50 1 50 0 0 0 • 8 3G.3 3 17.8 2 11.8 2 11.8 3 17.8 • 1 50 0 0 1 50 0 
Note 1 - Refer to Appendix 2 for indus try codes . 
-· 
Two melhods Two melhods Coni>ilatlon of 
inoomHlcr. Income-deer. inoomHlcr. 
& lncofn&.decr. 
No. " No. " No. " 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 14.3 
0 1 2G 0 
0 0 1 20 
1 7.7 0 0 
2 7.1 3 10.7 1 3.8 
0 2 5.9 3 8.8 
0 0 1 20 
1 9.1 0 2 .a 
0 1 4.!I 2 9.1 
0 0 8 27.3 
0 0 1 10 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 7.1 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 u 
0 0 0 
Note 2 - Due to roundi ng differences, percen tages may not sum exact l y  
to 1 00 . 
Total 
8 
7 
4 
5 
13 
28 
34 
5 
n 
22 
22 
10 
4 
14 
2 
17 
z 
.m 
60 
Table 13 presents descriptive statistics for the 
independent variable interest coverage by industry group 
for the period 1977-1979. An examination of the data 
for the industry group Meta l s  and Minerals (18) revealed 
that there was a firm 1n 1977 which had a l arge operating 
profit before tax ($3 , 598 , 436) and a very small interest 
expense ($9) , thus giving it an interest coverage ratio of 
399 , 827. This is c learly not a regularity with the firm in 
question as in 1978 and 1979 , its interest coverage ratio 
was 9. 23 and 2. 34 respectively. 
outlier was removed. 
As a result of this, the 
The industry group Builders' Suppliers (11) contained the 
highest interest coverage ratios over the period 
1977- 1979 with a mean of 271 , 182 , and 300 respective l y. 
For the year of 1977 , the standard deviation of 1 , 172 1s 
due to the large dispersion of the interest coverage ratios 
of the firms 1n the industry group Builders ' Suppliers. 
The lowest interest coverage ratio for any given firm 1s 3, 
whilst the highest is 5, 768. 
The industry group Metal s  and Minerals (18) contained the 
l owest interest coverage ratios over the period 1977- 1979 
with a mean of -52. 6, - 13. 3 , and -. 6 respective ly. For the 
year of 1977 , the l owest interest coverage ratio for any 
given firm is -727 , whil st the highest is 20. 
Table 1 3  
Note 2 - The 2 firms within the industry group Oil and Gas (19) did not 
permit the calculatio n  of an interest coverage ratio as they 
had no interest expense f or the year o f  1978. 
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Table 14 presents descriptive statistics for the 
independent variable size by industry group for the period 
1977-1979. The variable employed to measure firm size is 
total assets and is expressed in millions of dollars. The 
industry group Banks, Insurance and Trustees (01) was the 
largest in size in 1977 and 1978 with a mean of 909 and 970 
million dollars respectively. There is also a great deal 
of variability amongst the size of firms within that 
industry. The smallest firm in 1977 had 36.94 million 
dollars 1n total assets , whilst the largest had 6 , 5 10 
million dollars. For the year of 1979, the industry group 
Steel and Engineering (10) was the largest 1n size with a 
mean of 227 million dollars. The smallest firm within that 
industry had 8.6 6  million dollars in total assets , whereas 
the largest had 4 , 04 0  million dollars. 
�· ·-;1" 
Table 1 4  
Descriptive Statistics for Size by Industry Group 
Note 1 
Note 2 
Refer to Appendix 2 for industry codes . 
Total assets are e xpressed in millions of dollars . 
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6 . 2  Univariate Analysis and D i s c u s s i o n  
T h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  s o f t w a r e  p a c k a g e  M i n i  t a b V e r s i o n 5 . 1  w a s  
u t i l i s e d 1 n  o r d e r  t o  c o n d u c t a l l  o f  t h e  un i v a r i a t e  t e s t s . 
A d i s c u s s i o n  a n d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  f o l l o w . 
H y p o t h e s i s  1 .  
T a b l e  1 5  p r o v i d e s  t h e  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  t e s t s  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  
b e t w e e n  i ndu s t r y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  a n d  t h e  c ho i c e  o f  me t ho d  i n  
a c c o u n t i n g  f o r  g o o dw i l l  o v e r  t h e  p e r i o d 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 9 . T h e  
o b t a i n e d  c h i - s q u a r e s  o v e r t h i s  p e r i o d a r e  2 . 5 1 9 , 1 . 0 7 9 ,  a n d  
5 . 9 3 1  r e s p e c t i v e l y  wh i c h a r e  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  c r i t i c a l  v a l u e s  
o f  c h i - s q ua r e  o f  1 1 . 0 7 a n d  9 . 2 4 a t  t h e 5 %  a n d  1 0 %  l e v e l s  
w i t h  5 d e g r e e s  o f  f r e e d o m . T h e  nu l l  hypo t h e s i s  1 s  a c c e p t e d 
t h a t  t h e r e i s  no s i g n i f i c a n t  a s s o c i a t i o n  b e t w e e n  i n du s t r y 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a n d  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  me t h o d  i n  a c c o un t i n g  f o r  
g o o dw i l l  b y  f i r m s . 
T h e  r e s u l t s  d o  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y r e f u t e  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  a s  
t h i s  a n a l y s i s  o n l y  d e a l t  w i t h 6 i n d u s t r i e s , e a c h o f  wh i c h 
d i d  n o t  c o n t a i n  a l a r g e  num b e r o f  f i rm s . I n  a dd i t i o n , a 
t o t a l  o f  1 1  i n d u s t r i e s we r e  e x c l ud e d  f r o m  t h e  a n a l y s i s  
b e c a u s e  o f  i n s u f f i c i e n t  n umb e r s  w i t h i n  e a c h  i n d u s t r y . A 
l a r g e r  s a mp l e  s i z e w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  numb e r s  1 0  e a c h  o f  t h e  
1 7  i n du s t r y g r o u p s  w o u l d  e n a b l e  a mo r e  v a l  i d  t e s t  t o  b e  
c o n d u c t e d . 
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T ab l e  1 5  
T e s t s  o f  As s o c i a t i o n  b e twe e n  I ndus t ry C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  a nd 
t h e  Cho i c e  o f  Ac coun t i ng M e t hod 
Year Obtained di Critical values 
chi-square of chi-square at 
5" 10" 
1 977 2.5 19  5 1 1 .07 9.24 
1 978 1 .079 5 1 1 .07 9.24 
1 979 5.931 5 1 1 .07 9.24 
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Hypotheses 2 and 3 .  
Table 16 provides the results obtained from testing the 
difference 1n the interest coverage ratios of firms that 
use income-increasing and firms that use income-decreasing 
methods of accounting for goodwill over the period 1977-
1979 . The variable INTCOV ER 1s not significant at both the 
5 %  and 10% leve ls with probabilities of . 14, . 19, and . 17 
respectively. The alternate hypothesis is rejected that 
managers of firms who choose income-increasing methods of 
accounting for goodwill are more likely to have lower 
interest coverage ratios than those who choose income-
decreasing accounting methods. This supports what 
Pavletich (1989) found in that the variable INTCOVER 1s an 
unsuitable indicator as it does not capture the 
re lationship of accounting choice to debt constraints over 
time. 
Table 17 provides the results obtained from testing the 
difference 1n the frequency of income-increasing and 
income-decreasing methods of accounting for goodwill 
adopted by firms as a result of the presence of public 
debenture s on issue 
obtained chi-squares 
over the period 1977- 1979. 
over this period are . 20 0, . 5 60 
The 
and 
. 26 5  respectively which are less than the critical values 
of chi-square of 3. 84 and 2. 71 at the 5 %  and 10 % levels 
with 1 degree of freedom. The alternate hypothesis 1 s  
rejected that managers of firms who choose income ­
increasing methods of accounting for goodwill are more 
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Tab l e  1 6  
Tests of Difference in the Interest Coverage Ratios of 
Firms that use Income-Increasing and Income-Decreasing 
Methods 
Year Income-increasing Income-decreasing !-lest (pmbabi/ny) 
Mean Mean 
[Standard deviation] [Standard deviation] 
1 977 77 9.3 
[521 ] (36.4] 
n = /29 n =84 t= 1. 48  (p =. 14) 
1 978 58 1 8.7 
(306) [73.7) 
n = !!6 n =68 t= 1.32 (p = . 19) 
1 979 99 26 
[532) (1 1 2) 
n = !!2 n =63 t= !.40 (p = . !7} 
,- ·� 
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Table 1 7  
Tests of Differ ence 1 n  the Frequency of Income- Incre a s ing 
and Income-Decrea sing Methods Adopted by Firms a s  a Result 
of Debenture s  on Is sue 
Year Obtained di Critical values 
chi-square of chi-square at 
5" 10% 
1 977 0.2 1 3.84 2.71 
1 978 0.56 1 3.84 2.71 
1 979 0.265 1 3.84 2.71 
-··· 
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l ike ly to have pub l ic debentures on issue than those who 
choose income -decreasing accounting methods. This outcome 
is in contrast to Pavletich (1989) who found that a proxy 
for the 
powerful 
presence of pub l ic debentures led to a more 
test thus providing support for the debt 
hypothesis. 
Hypoth e s i s  4. 
Table 18 provides the results obtained from testing the 
diffe rence in the size of firms that use income-incre asing 
and firms that use income-decreasing methods of accounting 
for goodwill. For the year of 1978 , it was found that the 
variable SIZ E is significant at the 1 0 %  l evel (p = . 069) 
and 1s in the correct direction. The a l ternate hypothesis 
is accepted that firms which choose income-increasing 
methods of accounting for goodwill are more likely to be of 
a smaller size than those firms who use income-decreasing 
accounting methods. In 197 7  and 1979 , (p = .13 and p = .12 
respectively) the variable SIZ E approaches significance and 
is once again in the correct direction . 
Davis and Cosenza (1988) point out that more confide nce can 
be pl aced 1n the resu l ts of a statistical test if there is 
a larger sample size, ceteris paribus. In this study , the 
fact that the variable SIZ E is in the correct direction for 
all of the three years and approaches significance in 197 7  
and 197 9  appears to indicate that the size hypothesis was 
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Table 1 8  
Tests of Difference in Size of Firms that use 
Income- Increasing and Income-Decreasing Methods 
Year Income-increasing Income-decreasing I-test (pn,hab1lny/ 
Mean Mean 
[Standard deviation J [Standard deviation) 
1 977 $71 1 64 888 $197 660 672 
{$1 92 884 304) [$740 1 87 648) 
n = l44 n =84 t= 1.54 (p =. 13} 
1 978 $55 1 73 508 $239 1 86 304 
[$94 776 1 20) ($835 61 6 384) 
n = 126 n = 71 t= l.85 (p =.069} 
1 979 $71 341 384 $171 540 1 60 
($1 1 8  743 056) ($51 2 675 552) 
n = 120 n =66 t= 1.56 (p =. 12} 
7 1  
not supported in each of the three years due to sampling 
error. Therefore, it is expected that the siz e  hypothesis 
would be supported 1n each of the three years if a larger 
sample size or a different sample of firms were used. 
Hypotheses 5 and 6. 
As there is no published research 1 n  relation to the 
association between single and dual policies of accounting 
for goodwill and the interest coverage ratios of firms, two 
hypotheses were stated as no guide 1s provided as to what 
might be expected. 
Table 19 provides the results obtained from testing the 
difference in the interest coverage ratios of firms that 
use single income-increasing and firms that use dual 
policies of accounting for goo dwill over the period 
1977- 1979. The variable INTCOV ER 1s not significant at 
both the 5% and 10 % levels with probabilities of . 19, . 13, 
and . 13 respectively. The null hypothesis is accepted that 
there is no difference 1n the interest coverage ratios of 
firms that use single income-increasing and firms that use 
dual policies of accounting for goodwill. 
Table 20 provides the results obtained from testing t he 
difference 1 n  the interest coverage ratios of firms that 
use single income-decreasing and firms that use dual 
policies of accounting for goodwill over the period 
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Tabl e  19 
Tests  of D ifference in Interes t  Coverage Ratios o
f F irms 
t hat use Singl e  Income-Increasing and Firms that use
 
Dual Policies 
Year Single income-increasing Dual I-test (pn:,bi,J,i/i(y) 
policy policy 
Mean Mean 
[Standard deviation) [Standard deviation) 
1 977 77 1 6.2 
[521 ) [22) 
n = l29 n = l9 t= l.33 (p = . l!J) 
1 978 58 1 4  
(306) (20.5) 
n = ll6 n =23 t= 1.54 (p =. 13) 
1 979 99 21 .7 
[532) (44.5) 
n = ll2 n =.20 t= 1.51 (p =. 13) 
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Table 20 
Tests of Dif ference 1n Interest Coverage Ratios of Firms 
that use Single Income-Decreasing and Firms that use 
Dual Policies 
Year Single income-decreasing Dual I-test (pmbabtli(Y} 
policy policy 
Mean Mean 
[Standard deviation] [Standard deviation] 
1977 9.3 1 6.2 
[36.4] [22] 
n =84 n = !9 t= 1.08 (p =.29) 
1978 1 8.7 1 4  
[73.7] (20.5] 
n =68 n =23 t=. 48  (p =.64) 
1979 26 21 .7 
[1 1 2] [44.5) 
n =63 n =20 t=.26 (p =. 79) 
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1977-1979. The variable I NTCOV ER is not significant at 
both the 5 %  and 10% le vels with probabilities of . 29, . 64, 
and . 79 respectively. The null hypothesis is accepted that 
there is no difference in the interest coverage ratios of 
firms that use si ngle income-decreasing and firms that use 
dual policie s of accounting for goodwill. 
Hypotheses 7 and 8. 
As there is no published research in relation to the 
association between single and dual policies of accounting 
for goodwill and the size of firms, two hypotheses were 
stated as 
expected. 
no guide is provided as to what might be 
Table 2 1  provides the results obtained from testing the 
difference in the size of firms that use single income ­
increasing and firms that use dual policies of accounting 
for goodwill over the period 1977- 1979. The variable SI Z E  
is not significant at both the 5 %  and 10 % le vels with 
probabilities of . 27 ,  . 11, and . 78 respect i vely. The null 
hypothesis is accepted that there is no difference in the 
size of firms that use single income-increasing and firms 
that use dual policies of accounting for goodwill. 
. .... .. 
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Table 21  
Tests of Difference in Size  of Firms that use S ingle 
Income-Increasing and Firms that use Dual Pol icies 
Year Single income-increasing Dual I-test (pml:ldb1lity} 
policy policy 
Mean Mean 
[Standard deviation] [Standard deviation) 
1 977 $71 1 64 888 $48 370 288 
[$1 92 884 304] [$56 205 656) 
n = /44 n = /9 t = I. '' (p =.27) 
1 978 $55 1 73 508 $96 307 776 
[$94 776 1 20) [$1 1 2  907 280) 
n = /26 n =2.J t= 1.64 (p = . !J) 
1 979 $71 341 384 $78 238 496 
[$1 1 8  743 056] [$99 1 26 736) 
n = /20 n =20 t= .28 (p = . 78) 
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Table 2 2  provides the results obtaine d from testing the 
difference 1n the size of firms that use single income ­
decreasing and firms that use dual policies of accounting 
for goodwill over the period 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 9 . For the year of 
1 9 7 7 , it was found that there 1s a significant difference 
at the 1 0 %  level (p = . 0 7 1 ) . The null hypothesis which 
states that there 1 s  no difference 1 n  the s i ze of firms 
that use single income-decreasing and firms that use dual 
policies of accounting for goodwill is able to be re j ected . 
Firms that use single income-decreasing policies of 
accounting for goodwill are larger in size than those who 
use dual policies. In 1 9 7 8  and 1 9 7 9  (p = . 1 6 and p = . 1 7 
respectively) the variable SIZ E  approaches significance and 
1s in the same direction to that of 1 9 7 7 . Further research 
1s necessary 1n order to verify the stated relationship . 
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Table 22 
Tests of D ifference in  Si ze of Firms that
 use S i ngle 
Income-Decreas i ng and Firms that use Dual Pol icies 
Year Single income-decreasing Dual I-lest (pmlMl,;/;o,J 
policy policy 
Mean Mean 
[Standard deviation] [Standard deviation] 
1 977 $1 97 660 672 $48 370 288 
($740 1 87 648) ($56 205 565] 
n =84 n = 19 t= 1.83 (p =.071) 
1 978 $239 1 86 304 $96 307 776 
, [$835 61 6 384) [$1 1 2  907 280) 
n = 71 n =23 t= 1.4 (p = . 16) 
1 979 $171 540 1 60 $78 238 496 
($512 675 552) ($99 1 26 736) 
n =66 n =20 t= 1.39 (p = . 17) 
7. 1 Summary 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
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The principal research question addressed 1n this thesis 1s 
what factors explain an Australian firm's approach to 
accounting for goodwill 1n the pre-standard era. Utilising 
a costly contracting framework, determinants of the 
accounting policy choice were proposed and three separate 
groups of hypotheses were developed. The hypotheses were 
tested by utilising univariate procedures .  
The ex ante hypothesis 1n this study relates the choice of 
method 1n 
classification 
association. 
accounting for goodwill to industry 
and found that there was no significant 
The result does not necessarily refute the 
hypothesis as this analysis only dealt with a small number 
of industries, each of which did not contain a large number 
of firms. It 1s believed that a larger sample size with 
sufficient numbers in each of the industry groups would 
enable a more valid test to be conducted. 
The second group of hypotheses relate ex post incent i ves to 
the choice of method in accounting for goodwill. In 
relation to the debt hypothesis, the association of 
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INTCOVER and the choice of accounti ng method 1s not 
s i gnificant whi ch conforms to what was expected. Contrary 
to be to expectati on ,  the debt hypothesis 1 S  unable 
supported when usi ng DEBS as an explanatory var i able. A 
test of the size hypothesis provides support for the 
i ncome-i ncreas i ng proposition that firms which choose 
methods of accounti ng for goodw ill are more likely to be of 
a smaller size than those firms who choose 1ncome-
decreas i ng accounting methods. 
The final group of hypotheses seeks to ascerta i n  whether 
there i s  a d i fference in the s i ze and the interest coverage 
rati os of fi rms that use si ngle and f i rms that use dual 
poli c i es of accounti ng for goodwill. In relati on to the 
variable INTCOVER , i t  was found that there 1 6  no 
s i gn i f i cant di fference amongst firms that ei ther use si ngle 
i ncome-i ncreas ing or si ngle i ncome-decreasi ng policies of 
accounting for goodwi ll and fi rms that use dual policies. 
In respect of the vari able SIZ E i t  was found that there 1s 
a s ignificant di fference in the s1ze of f irms that use 
s i ngle i ncome-decreasi ng and firms that use dual poli c i es 
of accounti ng for goodwi ll. F i rms that use s ingle income-
decreasing policies of accounting for goodw ill are larger 
10 s i ze than those who use dual policies. 
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7 . 2  L i mitations of the Study 
The majority of studies that have tested the debt and size 
hypotheses have investigate d managers choices of a single 
procedure as oppose d to their choices of a portfolio of 
procedures. I t  may be argue d that this re duces the power 
of the tests (Watts and Zimmerman [ 1986] ) .  Adopting 
a portfolio approach as utilise d by Zmijewski and Hagerman 
(1981) enables more powerful tests to be conducte d. This 
approach suggests that managers are concerne d with the 
overall effect of their accounting choices rather than the 
effect of each individual accounting method. The current 
study investigates managers choices of a single proce dure. 
As a result of this, it may be argue d that less confidence 
can be placed 1n the results as compare d to if it had 
investigate d 
proce dures . 
managers choices of a portfolio of 
The hypotheses in this study were teste d by employing 
univariate proce dures. The utilisation of multivariate 
proce dures may have provide d gre ater explanatory power as 
it would enable an investigation of the interactions and 
dependencies amongst variables. 
As was pre viously alluded to, the criteria for inclusion in 
the AGSM Annual Report File 1n any one year 1s that the 
listing by amongst the top 500 with regard to market 
capitalisation. The sample 1n the current study was drawn 
from the AGSM Annual Report File, hence there are no 
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"small " companies i ncluded. In testing the size hypothesis 
it should be noted that s i z e  was on a comparative basis , 
be i ng small as compared to the much larger ones. As a 
result of thi s ,  the generali sability of the results are 
l i m i ted to large, l i sted publi c  companies. 
7. 3 Areas for Further Research 
In this study , i ndustry classifi cat ion was utilised as an 
explanatory var iable that would be expected to expla i n  the 
moti vati ons of account ing choi ces by firms. I t  was found 
that there 1 s  no s i gn i f i cant assoc iation between i ndustry 
classi f i cat ion and the choi ce of method i n  accounting for 
goodw ill by f irms. The test of the i ndustry hypothes i s  
only dealt w i th 6 i ndustries be i ng: Retailers and Merchants 
(5) , Me dia and Other Se rvi ces (6), Food, Dr ink and Tobacco 
(7), Steel and Engi neer i ng (10), Builders ' Suppliers (1 1), 
and Metals and M i nerals ( 18). Further research could be 
conducted i n  relat ion to the 1 1  industries not i ncluded i n  
the test of the i ndustry hypothesis and may f ind that there 
1s an associ ation betwee n  i ndustry classificati on and the 
choi ce of method in account i ng for goodwill by firms. 
The debt and s1 ze hypotheses were tested by exam ining the ir 
relat i onsh i p  to managements ' cho ice of method i n  account i ng 
for goodwi ll i n  the pre-standard era. The bonus plan 
hypothesis was not tested as sche me details of Austral ian 
companies compensati on plans are not on publ ic record. 
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It is suggested that this hypothesis be tested if scheme 
details become available as they are in the U. S. A or if a 
satisfactory alternative approach can be employed to test 
it. 
The variable employed to measure firm size in this study is 
total asse ts. A test of the s i ze hypothesis provides 
support for the proposition that firms which choose income-
increasing methods of accounting for goodwill are more 
likely to be of a smaller size than those firms who choose 
income-decreasing account ing methods. There are other 
surrogates for size, such as market capitalisation and 
turnover. Further research could utilise these surrogates 
and may f ind a st r on g er re 1 at ions hip or a 1 tern at iv e 1 y no 
relationship. 
Further research could examine whether there is a 
relationshi p  between profit increases or decreases and the 
method of accounting for goodwill. 
capitalised goodwill and allowed 
For example, have firms 
it to remain on the 
balance sheet unamortised when profit s  have decreased, or 
have they chosen to write i t  off when profits have 
increased ? The motivation for conducting such research is 
to ascertain whether there is a causal link between profit 
variation and the met hod of accounting for goodwill by 
firms. 
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APPBNDIX 1 
CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OP GOODWILL 
STATEMENT DI. I 
AAS !  
EXPOSURE DRAFT 23 
EXPOSCRE DRAFT 23 
AAS 18 
ASRB 1013 
ASRB 1013 
Stated that goodwill should normally be 
classified as a fixed asset. 
The first to recommend an accounting 
treatment in relation to goodwill . 
Accounting for Goodwil l .  
Issued in May 1 983. 
Subsequently revised and issued as 
Statement of Accounting Standards AAS 1 8  
in March 1 984. 
Effective for all balance dates on or 
after 31 March 1 985. 
AAS 1 8  approved by the Accounting 
Standards Review Board as ASRB 1 01 3  
o n  1 8  April 1 988. 
Effective for all balanc-.e dates on or 
after 1 9 June 1 988. 
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APP ENDI X  2 
A.A.S.E. INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION 
GROUP SUB-GROUPS 
No. Name No. Name 
Banks, Insurance and 11 Banks 10 Steel and Engineering 101 Steel Manufacturers 
Trustees 12 Insurance 102 Steel Merchants 
13 Trustees 103 Heavy Engineering 
2 Finance and Investment 21 Instalment Credit 104 Machinery Manufacturers 
22 lm1estment and Distributors 
23 Others 10!5 Light Engineering, Sheet 
24 Property Trusts Metal Workers etc. 
3 Pastoral 31 Pastoral and Agricultural 11 Builders' Suppliers 111 Building Materials 
4 Transport 41 Land and Air Manufacturers 
42 Sea 112 Building Materials 
5 Retailers and Merchants 51 Retailers and Merchants Suppliers 
6 Media and Other Services 61 Radio Broadcasters 12 Developers and 121 Builders 
62 Television Broadcasters Building Contractors 122 Land Developers 
63 Accommodation 13 Electrical and Durables 131 Electrical and Electronic 
64 Newspapers .ind Publishers Equipment ( excluding 
65 Printers, Stationers, Office computers) 
Equipment (including 14 Automotive 141 Manufacturers of Vehicles 
computer services) Parts and Accessories 
66 Other Services 142 Automotive Distributors 
7 Food, Orink and Tobacco 71 Flow Miffers, Bread, Pastry 143 Petroleum Distributors 
and Cake Manufacturing 144 Tyre Manufacturers 
72 Me.it 15 P.iper .ind P.iper Products 151 M.inuf.icturers 
73 Sugar 152 Merchants 
74 Other Food 153 Packaging 
75 Brewers and Vintners 
76 Aerated 'w' aters 16 (Vacam) 
77 Tobacco 17 (Vacant) 
8 T eHtiles and Clothing 81 TeHtiles 18 Metals and Minerals 181 Silver, Lead, Zinc, Copper 
82 Clothing 182 Tin 
83 Leather 183 Rutile, Zircon 
9 Chemicals, Glass, 91 Chemicals, Plastics, Inks 184 Gold 
Rubber 92 Paint 185 Uranium 
93 Fertilisers 186 Nickel 
94 Glass 187 Coal 
9!5 Gas Distribution 188 Miscellaneous including 
96 Rubber Growers Mining Investment 
97 Rubber Manufacturers 19 Oil and Gas 191 Oil and Gas EHplor ation 
and Production 
20 (Vac.int) 
Source: Australian Stock Exchange Journal ( 1979, p. 29) 
APPENDIX 3 
SAMPLE BY INDUSTRY CLASSIPICATION 
Banks , I nsurance and Trustee s  ( 1 )  
Bank of Queensland 
National Bank of Australasia 
Commercial Union Assurance Company of Australia 
PAI Insurances 
Greater Pacific General Insurance 
Lumley (Edward ) 
Mercantile Mutual Insurance Company 
Ipec Holdings 
Finance and I nvestment (2) 
Alliance Holdings 
Australian Guarantee Corporation 
Mercantile Credits 
Forestwood Australia 
Great Western Australasia 
South Pine Quarries 
Whee lock Marden Investments 
AUC Holdings 
National Properties 
Auto Investments 
Capel Court Corporation 
Pastoral (3) 
Bennett and Fisher 
Elder Smith Goldsbrough Mort 
Southern Farmers Holdings 
Westwools Holdings 
Wilcox Mofflin 
Winchcombe Carson 
Transport (4) 
Ansett Transport Industries 
Brambles Industries 
Fleetways Holdings 
Mayne Nickless 
Thomas Nationwide Transport 
Transwest Haulage Holdings 
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Retailers and Merchants ( 5 )  
Angus & Coote Holdings 
Barry and Roberts 
Brash Holdings 
Buckley & Nunn 
Burns, Philp & Company 
Campell (A. G. ) Holdings 
Duro Travel Goods 
Griffiths Brothers 
Hardie Trading 
Lord (Keith) Holdings 
Martin (John) & Co. 
Mathers Enterprises 
OPSM Industries 
Myer Emporium 
Parrys Department Stores 
Reid (Walter) and Company 
Rothwells Outfitting 
Soul Pattinson (Washington H . ) & Company 
Boans 
Norman Ross Discounts 
Media and Other Services (6)  
Victorian Broadcasting Network 
Associated Broadcasting Services 
Country Television Services 
Examiner Northern TV 
TVW Enterprises 
Publishing and Broadcasting 
Telecasters North Queensland 
Rovers Hotels (Holdings) 
Advertiser Newspapers 
Consolidated Press Holdings 
Fairfax (John) 
The Herald and Weekly Times 
News 
Provincial Newspapers (Q L D) 
Quee nsland Press 
Syme (David) & Co. 
Davies Brothers 
Computer Accounting 
Idaps Computer Science 
Penfold (W. C . ) Holdings 
Birch, Carroll & Coyle 
Bryce (Robert) & Company 
Ensign Holdings 
Group Property Services 
Motor Funerals 
Protector Safety Industries 
Sunshine Australia 
Wells (Martin) Holdings 
Wills (G & R) Holdings 
Pacific Film 
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Food, Drink and Tobacco ( 7) 
Alli ed Mills 
Defi ance Mills 
F ielder Gillespie 
Gibsons 
Austral i an Bacon 
Mascot Industri es 
Metro Meat 
Protean Holdings 
S teiger 
Tancred Brothers Industries 
Bundaberg Sugar Company 
P ioneer Sugar Mi l l s  
Allens Confect ionery 
Arnott s 
Associated Dairies  
Cadbury Schweppes Aus t rali a 
Cheetham Consolidated 
Da vis Consol idated Indu stries 
Hutchinson (Robert ) Holdings  
Jones (Henry IXL) 
L i fes avers (Australasi a) 
Mau r i  B rothe r s  and Thomson 
Provincial Trader s  Hold ings 
QUF Indu stries 
Reck itt  and Colman Aus t ralia 
White (Joe) M a l t ings 
Peter s Ice cream (W . A.) 
Pete r s ville Aust r ali a 
Carlton and United Breweries 
Cou rage Brewers 
Hungerford H i l l  
S .A. B rewing Holdings 
Tooheys 
The Swan B rewery Company 
C-C Bottlers 
Amat il 
Morris (Philip) Aust r alia 
Rothmans of Pal l M a l l  (Aust r al i a )  
Textiles and Clothing (8) 
K innea r s  
Ela st ic Webbing Indust r ies  
Foster (John) Valley 
Gaza ! Indust r ies 
Leroy F a shion Group 
Ma scot M i lls 
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Chemicals , Glass , Rubber (9) 
Austr alian Chemical Holdings 
Collie (Australia) 
Cooke (Sidney) 
Gibson Chemical Industries 
ICI Austr alia 
Kiwi International Company 
Nicholas International 
Nylex Corporation 
Swift & Co. 
Roche-Ma ag 
Campell B rothers 
Taubmans Industries 
Austr alian Fertilizers 
Allied Rubber Mills 
Hopkinson Odi um 
Steel and E ngineering (1 0 )  
The Broken Hill P roprieta ry Company 
Aust ralian Nat ional I ndust r ies 
Ma rtin B right Steels 
Aquila Steel Company 
Comeng Holdings 
Wood H all 
W right (W alter )  Industr ies 
Byrne & Da vidson Indust ries 
Eglo Engineer ing (Ser v ices) 
Fire Fight ing Enterprises 
Hills Industries 
N.K.S . Holdings 
Viscount Holdings 
S iddons Indust ries 
Act rol 
Gerra rd Company of Aust r alasia 
Hendersons Industr ies 
Indust r ial Engineering 
Mc Kay (Ralph) 
Met ro Indust ries 
P roduction E quipment 
Wa ugh and Josephson Holdings 
W reckair  Holdings 
Builders ' Supplier s  (11 )  
Acmil 
Adelaide B righton Cement Holdi ngs 
Besser (Q L D) 
Bo r al 
B r adfo rd Insulation Holdings 
B rick and Pipe Indust r ies 
Clifton B rick Holdings 
Concrete Industries (Monier) 
F a rley & Lewers 
Gol i ath Cement Holdings 
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Humes 
Hunter Douglas 
North Aus trali an Cement 
Ormonoid Roofing & Asphalts 
P ioneer Concrete Services 
Quarry I ndus tr i es 
Rocla Indus tri es 
S . A. Plywood Holdings 
Shannons 
Stramit 
Swan Portland Cement 
Unibi l t  Ho ldings 
ARC Industri es 
Cowells 
Kwikform I ndus tri es 
Reece ( H.J . )  Holdi ngs 
Wilkinson Day and Grimes 
Developers and Building Contractors (12) 
Calderman 
Enacon 
Ho l l and ( John) Ho ldings 
Latec Inves tments 
Or l it Ho ldings 
Watkins Consol idated 
Austral ian I nternat ional & British 
Hooker Corporation 
Varley Inves tments 
Entrad 
Electrical and Durables (13) 
Amalgamated W i reless ( Aus tralas ia) 
Kemtron 
Malleys 
Simpson Pope Ho ldings 
Tyree Indus tries 
Warburton O ' Donnel l  
Automotive (14) 
Chrys ler Aus tral ia 
Flexdr i ve Indus tries 
GUD Holdings 
Kencord Ho ldings 
Nat ional Consol idated 
Repco 
Automoti ve Ho ldings 
Eagers Holdings 
Lanes Motors Ho ldings 
Mortlock Bros . 
Patterson- Cheney ( B i l l ) 
W interbottom Ho ldings 
York Motors Holdings 
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Sleigh (H. C. ) 
Uniroyal Holdings 
Paper and Paper Products ( 1 5 )  
N Z  Forest Products 
Edwards Dunlop & Company 
Fibre Containers 
Metals and Minerals ( 1 8 )  
Conzinc Riotinto of  Australia 
M I M  H o l d i n g s  
Place r Development 
Pacific Coppe r 
Peko Wallsend 
Me ridian Oil 
E .  Z .  Industries 
Cudgen R. Z. 
Pan Continental Mining 
Weste rn Collie ries 
Austen & Butta 
Coal & Allied I ndustries 
Thiess Holdings 
Comalco 
Consolidated Gold Fields of  Australia 
Magnet Metals 
Metals Exploration 
M i d-East Mine rals 
Mine rals M i n i n g  & Metallurgy 
S outhland M i n i ng 
Car r Boyd Mine rals 
Oil and Gas ( 19) 
Beach Petroleum 
Crusade r Oil 
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